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Grading Patent Remedies
DEPENDENT CLAIMS
AND RELATIVE INFRINGEMENT
Daniel Harris Brean†
ABSTRACT
Patents define an inventor’s exclusive rights by reciting essential aspects
of the invention in sentences called claims. The claims are drafted in varying
degrees of technical specificity, such that each claim is legally distinct—some may
be valid or infringed while others are not. Most commonly, this variation is
accomplished by using a combination of “independent” and “dependent” claims.
Independent claims stand alone, while dependent claims incorporate by reference
all the features recited in the independent claims but go on to add further features
or details. The result is a range of potential infringing activity that triggers
liability, from the broadest, most conceptual claims to the narrowest, most
concrete claims.
Yet when it comes time to remedy infringement, this range of
infringement is too often treated as meaningless. Parties rarely bother to
distinguish between claims when assessing damages or injunctive relief. And
courts hold, for example, that damages owed for infringing one claim is no
different than the damages for infringement of any other claim in the patent. This
is not consistent with the law or common sense. Not every claim is of equal
technological or societal value, nor is infringement of every claim equally harmful
to the patent owner. Parties and courts should start paying more attention to the
relative significance of the patent claims involved.
This article focuses on dependent claims as a particularly useful vehicle
for evaluating relative patent remedies between claims. Any two patent claims
can be compared, though their relative scopes can be debatable when, for example,
two claims are directed to alternative embodiments. But dependent claims are, by
definition, narrower in scope than their base independent claims. Dependent
claims also are commonly employed to expressly cover commercial products or
preferred embodiments of inventions. As a result, dependent claims often protect
the core and most detailed disclosures of the patent specification, occupying the
most important competitive space to the patent owner. The relative value of those
claims to patent owners, infringers, and the public, should be evaluated as part of any
sound patent remedies assessment.
† Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law; Of
Counsel, The Webb Law Firm. Thanks to Bryan Clark, Ryan Holte, Camilla Hrdy, Dmitry
Karshtedt, Oskar Liivak, Sarah Wasserman Rajec, Deepa Varadarajan, Saurabh
Vishnubhakat, and Jon Wood for helpful comments and conversations. A draft of this paper
was presented at the Texas A&M Junior Faculty Workshop on the Patent-Tort Interface
on June 16, 2018. All opinions, as well as any errors, are my own and should not be ascribed
to my employers or clients. Comments are welcome to dbrean@uakron.edu.
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INTRODUCTION
In the U.S. patent system, inventors can define their own
exclusive rights. At the end of their patent applications, inventors
“claim” their inventions by reciting what amounts to a description of
the invention’s essential features in sentence form.1 The claims are
“peripheral,” in that they identify the conceptual boundaries of the
invention rather than any specific product or embodiment of the
invention within the periphery. 2 The claim effectively defines the
limits of the exclusive right to which the inventor believes he or she
is entitled. If the claim language recites patentable subject matter,3
a patent is issued and the patent owner is granted the right to
exclude others from practicing the invention within the scope of the
claim.4
Inventors usually include multiple claims in their
applications, each claim reciting the scope of the invention to a
different degree of technical specificity, and all such claims might
ultimately be granted and included in the patent. Some claims will
define the invention more broadly (e.g., reciting only certain essential
elements of the invention), while others will define the invention more
narrowly (e.g., reciting certain implementation details, selected
materials, or optional features). Most commonly, this is accomplished
by including a combination of “independent” and “dependent” claims.5
Independent claims stand alone and recite a complete invention.
Dependent claims incorporate by reference all the features recited in
the independent claims but go on to add further features or details.6
Dependent claims are thus narrower in scope than the broader
independent claims from which they depend. In a sense, this causes

1 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012 & Supp. V 2018) (“The specification shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject
matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.”).
2 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking
Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 1743, 1744 (2009) (“In modern American
patent doctrine, we define what the patentee owns not by what she actually built or
disclosed, but by what she claimed. Courts and commentators regularly analogize patent
claims as akin to the ‘metes and bounds’ of a real property deed, defining the outer
boundaries of a ‘property’ right conferred on the patentee. According to this view, known
as the peripheral claiming approach, words of a claim form a sort of conceptual ‘fence’ that
marks the edge of the patentee’s rights.” (footnotes omitted)).
3 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112.
4 Id. §§ 154(a)(1), 271; Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333,
1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“It is axiomatic that the claims mark the outer boundaries of the
patent right to exclude.”).
5 35 U.S.C. § 112(c) (“A claim may be written in independent or, if the nature
of the case admits, in dependent or multiple dependent form.”).
6 Id. § 112(d) (“[A] claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim
previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed.
A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the
limitations of the claim to which it refers.”).
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redundancy—to infringe the narrower dependent claim is necessarily
to infringe the broader independent claim as well.
As this article will show, dependent claims were originally
conceived as a means to boost examination efficiency, but they have
come to serve other purposes and otherwise influence how the patent
system operates. While many such aspects of dependent claiming have
been discussed by commentators,7 this article will provide some muchneeded scholarly attention to the role that dependent claims can play in
setting proper patent remedies.
This article proceeds in four Parts. Part I introduces the basic
legal and practical attributes of dependent claims, including how
they originated to improve examination efficiency. Part II
demonstrates how dependent claims have since evolved to serve a
variety of functions beyond examination efficiency, from allowing
patent owners to hedge their bets on claims being both valid and
infringed, to expressly protecting commercial products, to signaling
the core or most important embodiments of the invention. Part III
7

Notable scholarship concerning dependent claiming has included:

(1) Discussions of claim differentiation doctrine and other claim construction
issues. See, e.g., Neil Barnes, Cracking the Claim Construction of “Code” in
Interdigital v. International Trade Commission, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 69
(2012); Tony A. Gayoso & Irving N. Felt, Can a Patent Claim that Refers to
Another Claim be Independent? Pfizer v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Reconsidered,
89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 740 (2007); Mark A. Lemley, The Limits
of Claim Differentiation, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1396 (2007); Peter S.
Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction: A Modern Synthesis and Structured
Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 754 (2010); Jason N. Nolan,
Formalism and Patent Claim Drafting: The Status of De Facto Independent
Claims Under the Fourth Paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 263 (2011); Landon M. Reeves, Claim Construction and Unpredictably
Limiting the Patentee’s Rights, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 333 (2015);
(2) Prosecution history estoppel when dependent claims are rewritten in
independent form during prosecution, in light of Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v.
Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See, e.g., Matthew
Eggerding, Dependent Patent Claims and Prosecution History Estoppel:
Weakening the Doctrine of Equivalents, 50 ST. LOUIS L.J. 257 (2005); Justin E.
Gray, In-line or Insane? The Federal Circuit’s Recent Interpretation of Festo in
Honeywell v. Hamilton Sundstrand, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 100
(2006); Werner H. Sterner, Honeywell Int’l v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.: The
Federal Circuit Goes to the Extreme in its Latest Attack on the Doctrine of
Equivalents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 71 (2005); Wing H. Liang,
Note, Honeywell: The Straw That May Just Break the Inventor’s Back, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 2655 (2005); Andrew J. Tuck, Note, Honeywell International
Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp.: A Rose By An Independent Description
Does Not Smell As Sweet, 39 GA. L. REV. 1521 (2005); and
(3) Other empirical and policy implications. See, e.g., Kristen Osenga, The
Shape of Things to Come: What We Can Learn From Patent Claim Length, 28
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 617, 639 (2012) (comparing
number and length of dependent claims for U.S. and foreign applicants);
Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28
HARV. J. LAW & TEC 77, 115–19 (2014) (discussing dependent fee structures
and related strategies and incentives).
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assesses how these functions affect—and how they should affect—
infringement remedies, including enhanced patent damages upon
findings of willfulness. Finally, Part IV provides some
recommendations for how to best incorporate relative claim scope
into the adjudication of patent remedies. The article concludes that
the relative value of claims to patent owners, infringers, and the
public should be evaluated as part of any sound patent remedies
assessment.
DEPENDENT CLAIMS GENERALLY

I.

Suppose that an inventor invents a new apparatus for
lifting heavy objects that includes four components: a lever, a fixed
pulley, a movable pulley, and a rope attached to the lever and
wrapped around the pulleys:
Fixed
Pulley
Movable
Pulley

The patent application describes each element and how the
overall apparatus may be made and used. It mentions that nylon rope
is considered particularly effective. It also explains that the inclusion
of the movable pulley, though not technically required, doubles the
mechanical advantage and efficiency of the apparatus. A set of three
claims, one independent and two dependent, might look like this:
1.

An apparatus comprising:

a lever;
a fixed pulley; and
a rope;
wherein the rope is attached to the lever and extends around the fixed
pulley.
2.

The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the rope is made of nylon.

3. The apparatus of claim 1, further comprising a movable pulley,
and wherein the rope extends from the fixed pulley and around the
movable pulley.
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As is typical, the independent claim, claim 1, recites only the
bare essential aspects of the invention, while the dependent claims,
claims 2 and 3, add more specific technical and implementation details.
The relative scopes of these above sample claims might be depicted as
follows:

Claim 2

Claim 1

Claim 

Claim 1 above is drafted in the typical open-ended fashion, so
that anything “comprising” (i.e., including) a lever, a fixed pulley,
and a rope configuration is within the scope of the claim.8 As long as
an apparatus includes those essential elements, the apparatus can
include any additional elements and still be within the scope of the
claim (and thus infringing). This means that claim 1 includes, for
example, all of the following within its scope:
(a) an apparatus having only a single, fixed pulley;
(b) an apparatus having a fixed pulley and a movable pulley;
(c) an apparatus having two or more fixed pulleys;
(d) an apparatus having a fixed pulley and two or more movable
pulleys; and
(e) an apparatus having two or more fixed pulleys and two or more
movable pulleys.

Only examples (a) and (b) above are mentioned in the patent
application, yet the scope of the claim extends to cover examples (c), (d),
(e), and many more additional alternatives and permutations that were
not specifically contemplated by the inventor or mentioned in the
application. By contrast, claims 2 and 3 limit the claim scope to require
the particular optimal features that were contemplated by the inventor
and were expressly described in the patent application.
All else being equal, a narrower dependent claim is more likely
to be patentable (because each feature might provide additional
8 Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“‘Comprising’
is a term of art used in claim language which means that the named elements are essential,
but other elements may be added and still form a construct within the scope of the claim.”).
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distinctions over the prior art)9 but less likely to be infringed (because
each feature recited must be met by the accused device) 10 than its
broader independent base claim. Infringement of a broader
independent claim does not necessarily infringe its narrower
dependent claims, but a narrower dependent claim may be patentable
even if its broader independent claim is not.11
These qualities always apply to independent-dependent
claim pairs, but do not necessarily apply to any other claims not
linked by a dependent relationship. Any other two claims might have
some overlapping features but also each include distinct features
that have no technical relationship to each other. This makes the
relative scopes of such other pairs of claims less clear and more
debatable. For example, the features added by claims 2 and 3 above
have no technical relationship to each other that allows one to
discern their relative breadth—they are focused on two different
things. But because dependent claims, by definition, narrow the
scope of the independent claim, there is no question as to the relative
breadth of claim 2 or 3 as compared to claim 1. This makes
independent-dependent claim pairs uniquely efficient and useful for
comparison purposes.
Indeed, dependent claiming arose as an examination
efficiency boosting measure. While early practice required each claim
to stand on its own and be complete in itself, by the early 1900s, the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) allowed

9 Verdegaal Bros. v. Union Oil Co., 814 F.2d 628, 631 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“A claim
is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either
expressly or inherently described, in a single prior art reference.”).
10 Linear Tech. Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 566 F.3d 1049, 1060 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“To prove infringement, a patentee must show ‘that a defendant has practiced
each and every element of the claimed invention,’ and may do so by relying on either
direct or circumstantial evidence.” (quoting BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d
1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
11 Regarding infringement, see., e.g., Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc.,
870 F.2d 1546, 1552 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“One may infringe an independent claim and
not infringe a claim dependent on that claim. The reverse is not true. One who does not
infringe an independent claim cannot infringe a claim dependent on (and thus
containing all the limitations of) that claim.”); id. at 1553 (“It is axiomatic
that dependent claims cannot be found infringed unless the claims from which they
depend have been found to have been infringed.”). Regarding validity, see, e.g., 35 U.S.C.
§ 282(a) (2012) (“Each claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent, or multiple
dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims;
dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent
upon an invalid claim.”); In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1275 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (“Any grounds which would invalidate [dependent] claim 17 would by necessary
implication also invalidate claims 10 and 14 [from which claim 17 depends]”); Callaway
Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“A broader independent
claim cannot be nonobvious where a dependent claim stemming from that independent
claim is invalid for obviousness.”); Sandt Tech., Ltd. v. Resco Metal & Plastics Corp., 264
F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Because dependent claims contain additional
limitations, they cannot be presumed to be invalid as obvious just because the
independent claims from which they depend have properly been so found.”).
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dependent claiming. 12 In 1965, dependent claims were formally
recognized in the Patent Act.13 The Senate Committee Report for the
1965 amendments explained that there were two purposes to the
amendments made at that time: (1) “to increase the fees payable to
the Patent Office so that a reasonable part of the Patent Office costs
may be recovered”; and (2) “to expedite the prosecution of patent
applications and thus make new technology available to the public
at an earlier date.”14
As to the first objective, the amendments made a variety of
increases to the fee schedule, including financial incentives to make it
more cost effective to file more dependent claims and fewer independent
claims. 15 The hope was that this fee structure would “discourage
excessive permutations and combinations of claims and [ ] encourage
use of the dependent form of claim.”16 As to the second objective, the
Commissioner of Patents had told the committee that dependent claims
can be examined twice as quickly as independent claims,17 and so the
committee determined that an applicant’s insistence on including more
independent claims should require additional fees to offset those
additional examination costs. 18 The committee believed that these
efficiencies in evaluating claims would carry over in litigation as well.19
12 Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d 1131, 1148 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (Newman, J., concurring) (citing In re Sexton, 1873 C.D. 66 (Comm’r Pat. 1873)
and Ex parte Brown, 1917 C.D. 22 (Comm’r Pat. 1917)).
13 Id. (explaining that Congress “amend[ed] § 112 to recognize dependent claims,
amend[ed] § 282 to state the presumptive validity of dependent claims, and § 41 to reduce
the fee for dependent claims.” (citing Act of July 24, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-83, 79 Stat. 259)).
The amended Section 112 then provided: “A claim may be written in independent or
dependent form, and if in dependent form, it shall be construed to include all limitations of
the claim incorporated by reference into the dependent claim.” Act of July 24, 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-83, § 9, 79 Stat. 259, 261. The Patent Act was further amended in 1975 to
recognize multiple dependent claims to comply with the Patent Cooperation Treaty, and
the relevant provisions have remained essentially unchanged since then. Honeywell Int’l,
370 F.3d at 1148 (Newman, J. concurring) (citing Act of Nov. 14, 1975, Pub. L. 94-131 §§ 3,
7, 10, 89 Stat. 685, 690–92); 35 U.S.C. § 112.
14 S. REP. NO. 89-301, at 2 (1965).
15 Id. at 3–4; Act of July 24, 1965, § 1, 79 Stat. at 259 (setting new fees as “$10 for
each claim in independent form which is in excess of one, and $2 for each claim (whether
independent or dependent) which is in excess of ten”); see also Honeywell Int’l, 370 F.3d at
1152 (Newman, J., concurring) (“The use of dependent claims is encouraged by the patent
examining authority as an aid in examination. Its value during examination is reflected in
the significantly lower fees charged for examination of dependent claims.”).
16 S. REP. NO. 89-301, at 7–8.
17 Id. at 8 (“The Commissioner of Patents has informed the committee that
even in the case of simple patents, the time saved in analysing the differences between
claims is approximately [two] to [one] in favor of the dependent form of claim.”).
18 Id. (“This bill does not prevent an applicant from using independent claims. It
merely provides that if an applicant or his attorney decide that independent claims would
better serve the invention, then additional fees should be charged to compensate the Patent
Office for the undisputed additional costs involved in the examination of such applications.”).
19 Id. (“The reduction in the number of claims and the encouragement of the use
of claims in dependent form will not only be of advantage to the Patent Office and to the
public, but will assist the courts in their consideration of those claims which become
involved in litigation.”).
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Little did Congress know that dependent claiming would come to
perform a number of additional strategic roles for patent owners.
II.

FUNCTIONS OF DEPENDENT CLAIMING

The essential function of dependent claiming—examination
efficiency—remains an important part of the patent system. The
USPTO fee schedule continues to discourage excessive independent
claiming in favor of dependent claiming. 20 Beyond that efficiency,
because the scope of any dependent claim is subsumed by its associated
independent claim, it is, in that sense, redundant to the purpose of
defining the overall scope of the exclusive right. 21 Nonetheless,
dependent claiming has evolved to serve a number of other purposes.
Primarily, dependent claims are employed for: (1) hedging bets on
patentability and infringement; (2) providing support for claim
differentiation positions; and (3) protecting core embodiments and
commercial products.
First, from a patent applicant’s/owner’s perspective, having a
variety of independent and dependent claims in a patent allows patent
owners to hedge their bets on which claims will be both valid and
infringed. 22 Having narrower “backup” dependent claims not only
makes examination more efficient and likely to result in a patentable
claim during prosecution, but it also allows for more refined claim
assertion strategies in litigation. 23 In effect, each claim defines a

20 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(h)–(i) (2018); USPTO Fee Schedule, USPTO (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule [https://
perma.cc/5USY-58X9] (charging, for large entities, $460 for each independent claim in excess
of three and $100 for each claim in excess of 20).
21 Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719,
739 (2009); Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 995 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (“Of course, infringement of a dependent claim also entails infringement of its
associated independent claim.”).
22 See Fromer, supra note 21, at 739–40 (“They have come to be seen by patentees
as a form of insurance; should a broad independent claim be held invalid, the narrower
dependent claims would still stand, so long as they are independently valid. This fallback
protection has led to an abundance of dependent claims.” (footnote omitted)); Dennis
Crouch, Theory of Dependent Claims: Survey Results, PATENTLY-O, (May 22, 2008)
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/05/theory-of-depen.html [https://perma.cc/5X9L-M
HE] (finding in survey of 1,029 readers that more than 90% of respondents strongly or
mostly agree that dependent claims serve as a “backup” in the event that the base
“independent claim is rejected [during] prosecution” or “found invalid in litigation”); 1
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COUNSELING & LITIGATION § 9.07[c] (Lester Horowitz & Ethan
Horowitz eds. 2018) (“[During prosecution,] the practitioner should keep the way open to
argue in litigation the separate patentability of dependent claims. If one relies solely on the
arguments for allowability of base claims, it may foreclose later arguing that the dependent
claims are patentable or valid notwithstanding the fate of the base claims. If a dependent
claim introduces an element or feature not shown in the prior art, point this out. If it
introduces an old element, but the combination of such element with some other element(s)
of the base claim is novel, this should be stated.” (footnote omitted)).
23 See supra note 22.

1196

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:4

separate and distinct exclusive right and cause of action, 24 making
claiming strategy “the name of the game” in patent law.25
Second, dependent claims can be employed to bolster claim
construction positions under the doctrine of claim differentiation. The
doctrine presumes that a dependent claim is narrower in scope than
its independent base claim, as per Section 112(d)’s prescription that “a
claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously
set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter
claimed.”26 Thus, in the example rope/pulley/lever apparatus claims
above (in Part I, supra), the doctrine of claim differentiation would
presume that the “rope” of claim 1 is not a nylon rope but could be
made of other materials, given claim 2’s further limitation that “the
rope is made of nylon.” Although the doctrine can apply when
comparing any two claims in a patent, it has particular force in the
context of independent-dependent claim pairs.27 Patent applicants can
leverage this doctrine into a strategy by inserting dependent claims
that are limited to specific embodiments of the invention, for the
purpose of making the independent claims read as broader by
comparison.28
24 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012) (“Each claim of a patent (whether in independent,
dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of
other claims; dependent or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though
dependent upon an invalid claim.”); Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 370 F.3d
1131, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J., concurring) (“Each claim defines a separate invention,
whether or not written in independent form; and its validity stands or falls separately.”).
25 Giles S. Rich, The Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims—
American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L., 497, 499 (1990) (“To
coin a phrase, the name of the game is the claim.”).
26 35 U.S.C. § 112(d) (emphasis added); see, e.g., AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d
1234, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Under the doctrine of claim differentiation, dependent claims
are presumed to be of narrower scope than the independent claims from which they depend.”).
27 Lemley, supra note 7, at 1396 (“Patentees write dependent claims in order to
differentiate the scope of their claims, so it will often make sense to use claim
differentiation in that context. Indeed, an interpretation of an independent claim that
renders it identical to a claim that depends from it would defeat the purpose of having a
dependent claim.”); Menell et al., supra note 7, at 754 (“‘Pure’ claim differentiation refers
to the situation where there is no meaningful difference between an independent claim and
its dependent claim, except for the presence of an added limitation in the dependent claim.
In that situation, the presumption is especially strong that the independent claim is not
restricted by the added limitation in the dependent claim. In such situations, construing
the independent claim to share that limitation would render the dependent claim
‘superfluous.’ The doctrine of claim differentiation has less force when there are additional
differences between the independent claim and its dependent claim, such that the
dependent claim would not be rendered ‘superfluous’ by limiting the independent claim. In
the case of two independent claims, the doctrine of claim differentiation is generally not
applicable because patent drafters are free to, and commonly do, claim an invention using
multiple linguistic variations in multiple independent claims.” (footnotes omitted)); see also
Lemley, supra note 7, at 1397 (“Of the 69 Federal Circuit cases analyzed, 50 involved claim
differentiation arguments based on an independent-dependent relationship, 15 involved
arguments based on two independent claims, and 4 involved both. Notably, the Federal
Circuit applies claim differentiation 80% of the time when the claims are in a dependent
relationship, and rejects it more than half the time when claims are not.”).
28 Lemley, supra note 7, at 1398 (Applicants may draft claims “because the
drafter hopes to take strategic advantage of the claim differentiation doctrine itself.”);
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Third, dependent claims are employed to cover core
embodiments or protect commercial products of the patentee. 29
Although subsumed by the independent base claim, dependent
claims are valuable for their ability to highlight such important
aspects of the invention for the patent examiner or factfinder.30 The
patentees went out of their way to ensure that those dependent
features were expressly covered in the event of any doubt (or
invalidity) as to the broader independent claim. From this
perspective, Professor Jeanne Fromer concluded that dependent
claims allow patent owners to retain a semblance of the “central”
claiming approach (essentially, omnibus claims to the invention as
disclosed) that was long ago discontinued in favor of the modern
peripheral claiming approach.31
To be clear, dependent claims are still peripherally
construed just like independent claims, and thus are not truly
“central.”32 They nonetheless draw boundaries that stand closer to
the core invention than their independent counterparts, which
encompass more of a penumbra around the invention. As Professor
Christian Mammen put it:
[I]n each patent, there is often some core invention, surrounded by a
penumbra of literal meaning that is within the peripheral claim scope,
which in turn is surrounded by a penumbra of equivalents that are
outside the literal claim scope. Moreover, each pair of independent
and dependent claims represents a core and a penumbra, with the
dependent claim representing the narrower, more precisely defined
core and the independent claim representing the broader penumbra.
This image of a core and penumbra is further complicated by the

Janet Freilich, Patent Clutter, 103 IOWA L. REV. 925, 963 (2018) (“It is well established that
some language found in dependent claims serves functions such as clarifying the language
of other claims through the principle of claim differentiation.” (footnote omitted)).
29 Fromer, supra note 21, at 740 (“A dependent claim typically describes a subset
of the inventions communicated by the associated independent claim—prototypical
instantiations—providing unique insight into the patentee’s conception of central examples
or characteristics of his invention.” (footnote omitted)); Freilich, supra note 28, at 963 (“It
is well established that some language found in dependent claims serves functions such
as . . . highlighting a key embodiment.”).
30 Fromer, supra note 21, at 740; Freilich, supra note 28, at 963 (“It is well
established that some language found in dependent claims serves functions such as clarifying
the language of other claims through the principle of claim differentiation, or highlighting a
key embodiment.”); see also Crouch, supra note 22 (finding in survey of 1,029 readers that
more than 73% of respondents strongly or mostly agree that dependent claims serve focus on
commercial embodiments of the invention “to make infringement easier to explain to a jury”).
31 Fromer, supra note 21, at 740 (rather than the sentence-form peripheral claims
we use today, central claiming involved essentially an omnibus claim to the subject matter
disclosed in the patent application); see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1772–74
(observing that the doctrine of equivalents and means-plus-function style claiming both
continue the “legacy” of central claiming).
32 See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2, at 1780 n.148 (noting that even dependent
claims are still construed peripherally).
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multiplicity of independent and dependent claims that may be
included in a single patent.33

This core-penumbra concept is a helpful metaphor, as it seems to
capture all the essential functions of dependent claiming. The core
contains the “backup” dependent claims where patentability is more
likely, where the dependent claims are narrowly drawn so as to make
the penumbra broader by comparison, and where the most important
features may be expressly protected by those dependent claims.
Dependent claims serve all of these functions (including
examination efficiency), essentially, by being more closely tethered
to embodiments detailed in the specification than their base
independent claims. Drafted nearer to the core invention or
particular implementations envisioned by the inventor, such
dependent claims tend to be associated with the more concrete
teachings in the patent specification. As one approaches the outer
limits of the claims and enters the penumbra, however, the direct
utility of the patent’s teachings tends to fall off. Hence, such
penumbral claims are more likely to be invalid for failure to satisfy
the written description and enablement requirements—either
because the specification does not evidence possession of the broadlyclaimed invention or because the specification fails to enable the full
scope of the claim.34 Indeed, in her empirical study, Professor Janet
Freilich determined that independent claims tended to include more
“ancillary” claim language—language that “appear[s] in the claims,
but never or rarely in the specification.” 35 This is consistent with
33 See Christian E. Mammen, Patent Claim Construction as a Form of Legal
Interpretation, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 40, 63 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
34 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (“The specification shall contain a written description
of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or
with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same.”); Ariad Pharm., Inc. v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he test for sufficiency [of the
written description] is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably
conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject
matter as of the filing date.”); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1365
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“To be enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in
the art how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without ‘undue
experimentation.’” (quoting In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). A recent Federal Circuit case highlights this kind of danger in
overclaiming one’s invention. See Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., 896 F.3d 1357,
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[T]o some extent, BU created its own enablement problem. BU
sought a construction of ‘a non-single crystalline buffer layer’ that included a purely
amorphous layer . . . . Having obtained a claim construction that included a purely
amorphous layer within the scope of the claim, BU then needed to successfully defend
against an enablement challenge as to the claim’s full scope . . . . Put differently: if BU
wanted to exclude others from what it regarded as its invention, its patent needed to teach
the public how to make and use that invention. That is part of the quid pro quo of the
patent bargain.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
35 Freilich, supra note 28, at 928; see also id. at 958 (“Overall, slightly more than half
of ancillary language comes from independent claims (a median of 57% across the entire data
set). This varies across industries: from a low of 50% in pharmaceutical patents to a high of 60%
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views from other commentators who have bemoaned “overclaiming”
by patentees—i.e., patentees whose claims are drafted to be
substantially broader than the underlying invention disclosure in the
application.36
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF DEPENDENT CLAIMING FOR REMEDIES

Based on the above-described functions of dependent claiming,
dependent claims are places where the patent rights may often be
more valuable to the public than independent claims, thus justifying
comparatively stronger remedies. Contrary to the conventional
wisdom, dependent claims may also often be comparatively more
valuable to the patent owner. In either case, the result may be that
infringement of dependent claims warrants stronger remedies and
greater recovery than the norm, or that infringement of independent
claims warrants weaker remedies and lesser recovery than the norm.
Which result is more appropriate is debatable and would likely vary
case by case. It should be noted, however, that the status quo, where
the significance of independent claims greatly overshadows dependent
claims,37 has been criticized as leading to overcompensation in various
contexts and for various reasons.38
of ancillary language from independent claims in mechanical patents. . . . Note that ancillary
words in independent claims may also appear in dependent claims.”); id. at 928 (“Surprisingly,
although claims are supposed to be exclusively about the invention, approximately 25% of patent
claim language is not about the patent’s core invention.”); id. (“The practice of including ancillary
language in patent claims is roughly analogous to ‘keyword stuffing’—a technique of optimizing
a website’s Google ranking by packing the website with popular but irrelevant words to draw in
searchers. Ancillary language similarly obscures the invention actually protected by the patent
and taxes the ability of judges, examiners, competitors, and the public to read and understand
patent claims.” (footnotes omitted)).
36 See, e.g., Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1359,
1362 (2014) (“[P]atent attorneys intentionally draft the claims as broadly as possible. In many
cases, these claims end up covering variations or improvements that have little resemblance
to the original invention. Such overbroad claims reward inventors for technology that they
did not invent and unnecessarily burden downstream innovation.” (footnote omitted)); Mark
A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2285 (2016) (“A more
explicit focus on the breadth of the IP right will lead to better decisions, reducing both the
endemic overclaiming of IP rights and the occasional backlash that invalidates those rights
altogether.”); Oskar Liivak, Overclaiming Is Criminal, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1417, 1423–24 (2016)
(“Patent applicants and their attorneys have a duty to craft claims limited to the disclosed
invention . . . . [When claim drafting,] the general aim is to get as much real estate as possible.
Broad claims are not offered; they must be asked for. Unless checked, there is an incentive to
overclaim.”); Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent
Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1603 (2009) (“In practice, clever lawyering can
often produce a patent claim that covers more technological ground than is truly warranted
by the underlying invention.”).
37 See infra Section III.A.
38 See, e.g., Chao, supra note 36, at 1397–99 (“[B]oth the current lost profits and
reasonable royalty frameworks overcompensate the patentee. . . . The reason why lost profits
systematically overcompensates patentees is because the remedy is not designed to promote
innovation.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Boundaries of Patent Law: Distinguishing Lost Profits
from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 655, 674 (2009) (“Patent damages are
supposed to compensate patent owners for their losses, putting them back in the world they
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Proposals to modify patent remedies have tended to rely on
technological and economic considerations, rather than claim type and
relative scope. 39 This article’s proposal does not supplant but
supplements those earlier proposals’ efforts to ascertain the true
value—to the private stakeholders in the patent dispute and to the
public—of the claimed technology and infringement. Whether a
remedy is excessive or inadequate will depend on the facts of a given
case involving a given set of patent claims. What matters is that the
relative remedies as between claims becomes the subject of more
purposeful consideration and development alongside other remedies
would have inhabited but for infringement. The lost profits analysis contains sophisticated
economic tools to help courts calculate that but-for world. Unfortunately, the perfect has too
often been the enemy of the good, relegating a number of lost profits cases to the rather less
economically sophisticated analysis of reasonable royalties. Worse, the importation of
concepts from lost profits into reasonable royalty analysis, and the fear of undercompensating
deserving patent owners that should have been able to prove lost profits, has led to systematic
distortions in the reasonable royalty structure that overcompensate nonmanufacturing
patent owners.”); Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for
Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1666 (2010) (“[T]here is a
growing body of evidence that Georgia-Pacific has resulted in the systematic
overcompensation of patent owners in certain industries.”); David O. Taylor, Using
Reasonable Royalties to Value Patented Technology, 49 GA. L. REV. 79, 81–82 (2014) (“In the
last several years, commentators have expressed serious concerns with the state of the law
governing awards of reasonable royalties as damages in patent infringement cases. These
concerns range from uncertainty related to the underlying rationale and methodology for
calculating reasonable royalties, misplaced use of reasonable royalties to punish infringers,
excessive awards, and the creation of incentives for abusive negotiation and litigation tactics.
Given these concerns, the proper assessment of royalties has been a recent, frequent topic for
debate among economists and legal scholars. Economists have challenged basic premises of
the law governing reasonable royalties and injunctions based on various economic theories
and insights. Similarly, legal scholars have reassessed the governing law and, in particular,
traditional methodologies for calculating reasonable royalties.” (footnotes omitted)); Brian J.
Love, Note, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market Value Rule, 60 STAN. L. REV.
263, 293 (2007) (“[T]he entire market value rule systematically overcompensates patentees
who own patents covering only one component of a larger, complex device.”).
39 See, e.g., Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment to Rein in the
Georgia-Pacific Factors, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 40 (2008) (“Modern decisional law does
not restrict reasonable royalties to some portion of the economic value actually provided by the
patent and, in fact, provides almost no concrete guidance to the fact-finder in determining a
reasonable royalty. The result is that reasonable royalty awards are at best arbitrary and at
worst punitive.”); Lemley, supra note 38, at 674 (“Enforcing a strict separation between [lost
profit and reasonable royalty damages] and easing the burden of proof on lost profits will enable
both types of patent damages to serve the compensatory purpose for which they were intended.”);
Michael B. Risch, (Un)reasonable Royalties, 98 BOS. U. L. REV. 187, 259 (2018) (“[T]he invention’s
value should govern instead of obsessive focus on a hypothetical negotiation or rote adherence
to economically suspect rules.” (footnotes omitted)); Seaman, supra note 38, at 1667 (“[A]
reasonable royalty for patent infringement should not exceed the accused infringer’s expected
costs of adopting an acceptable noninfringing substitute.”); Ted M. Sichelman, Purging Patent
Law of ‘Private Law’ Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 571 (2014) (“[W]hen a patent covers a mere
component of a patented product, and an infringer’s switching costs are high, it will often be
more desirable to deny injunctive relief and reduce make-whole damages, regardless of whether
the patentee practices its patents.”); Taylor, supra note 38, at 162 (urging focus on value of
patented technology, explaining that “[l]eft unchecked, the hypothetical negotiation construct
inappropriately undercompensates or overcompensates patent owners.”). A notable exception
that does consider claim scope is Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1359 (2014), discussed infra notes 48–55 and accompanying text.
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reforms. Patent counsel and judges should pay more attention to the
nature of the claims being asserted so that remedies in any given
patent dispute may be properly calibrated.
A.

Identifying Value at the Invention’s Core

To justify the market disruptions that flow from granting
exclusive patent rights, the U.S. patent system demands high
quality disclosure of inventions in patent applications. 40 As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit recently
emphasized, “if [a patent owner] wanted to exclude others from
what it regarded as its invention, its patent needed to teach the
public how to make and use that invention. That is part of the quid
pro quo of the patent bargain.”41
The teachings regarding core embodiments in the patent
specification are arguably the most deserving of the patent rights
because it is those teachings that most enrich the public with helpful
examples and explanations of the invention. While those core
teachings tend to be more associated with dependent claims, it is the
vague notions of other, undisclosed options or features for the
invention that occupy the penumbra of the patent. Near that outer
periphery of the claim set is where the claims become more conceptual
and the hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art, as well as the
public, must imagine alternatives and implementation details for the
invention to fill out the boundaries of the claims. Those imagined
boundaries may well turn out to be wrong and, in any event, will not
become certain until well into a lawsuit when the district court
construes the claims. 42 Not only might claims turn out to cover
40 See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent system
represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public
disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly
for a limited period of time.”); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
151 (1989) (“In consideration of [the invention’s] disclosure and the consequent benefit to
the community, the patent is granted.”); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
481 (1974) (“When a patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated to
the general public and those especially skilled in the trade, such additions to the general
store of knowledge are of such importance to the public that the Federal Government is
willing to pay the high price of [seventeen] years of exclusive use for its disclosure, which
disclosure, it is assumed, will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of further
significant advances in the art.”).
41 Trs. of Bos. Univ. v. Everlight Elecs. Co., 896 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
42 See Jason Rantanen, The Malleability of Patent Rights, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV.
895, 935–41 (2015) (discussing how the skill and strategies of the attorneys can affect claim
construction outcomes); id. at 941 (“[C]laim ambiguity itself can be a deliberate strategic
choice. Patent drafters may choose, for example, claim terms and phrases that maximize
future malleability so that they can later argue for either expanding or narrowing
depending on the circumstances.”). Even after district courts construe the claims, there
remains a great deal of uncertainty at the Federal Circuit. See Retractable Techs. v. Becton,
Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (Moore, J., dissenting from the denial
of en banc rehearing) (“Claim construction is the single most important event in the course
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variations of the invention that are not described in the specification,
but they might even cover technology that did not exist until after the
patent issued.43 This ambiguity becomes especially problematic if the
invention is in a nascent field, where the inventor is expected to
provide more technical detail and explanation than in well-established
fields. 44 Likewise, if dependent claims are used for claim
differentiation purposes, that strategy may only serve to underscore
the vagueness of the independent claim—because the dependent claim
is more precisely limited, the doctrine only indicates how the
independent claim is not limited.45
For all these reasons, dependent claims might provide better
and more desirable public notice of what the invention is and what
rights are exclusive to the patentee. 46 If the primary way that the
patent system is designed to facilitate innovation is to spread
knowledge through clear and high-quality invention disclosures, a
stronger right for narrower dependent claims that encompass core and
well-disclosed embodiments would be sensible.47
of a patent litigation. It defines the scope of the property right being enforced, and is often
the difference between infringement and non-infringement, or validity and invalidity.
Despite the crucial role that claim construction plays in patent litigation, our rules are still
ill-defined and inconsistently applied, even by us. Commentators have observed that claim
construction appeals are ‘panel dependent’ which leads to frustrating and unpredictable
results for both the litigants and the trial court.”).
43 Chao, supra note 36, at 1368 (“Claims often cover variations of the invention
that are not described in the specification. In fact, broad claims can even encompass afterarising technology.”).
44 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A]
patentee preferably omits from the disclosure any routine technology that is well known at
the time of application. At the other end of the knowledge continuum, a patent document
cannot enable technology that arises after the date of application. The law does not expect an
applicant to disclose knowledge invented or developed after the filing date. Such disclosure
would be impossible. Nascent technology, however, must be enabled with a ‘specific and useful
teaching.’ The law requires an enabling disclosure for nascent technology because a person of
ordinary skill in the art has little or no knowledge independent from the patentee’s
instruction. Thus, the public’s end of the bargain struck by the patent system is a full enabling
disclosure of the claimed technology.”) (quoting Genetech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d
1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted)).
45 Cf. Chao, supra note 36, at 1362 (“The problem of broad claims is exacerbated
by the problem of unclear claims.”).
46 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898, 909–10 (2014) (“[A] patent
must be precise enough to afford clear notice of what is claimed, thereby apprising the public of
what is still open to them. Otherwise there would be a zone of uncertainty which enterprise and
experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims. And absent a meaningful
definiteness check, we are told, patent applicants face powerful incentives to inject ambiguity
into their claims.”(citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Chao, supra note 36, at 1374
(“[When claims are unclear,] competitors do not just have to worry about stepping inside the
boundaries protected by a patent’s claims; they must worry about stepping near those
boundaries too. As a result, companies may end up foregoing technology that is not actually
covered by a patent. In these cases, no one wins.” (footnote omitted)).
47 See William F. Lee & A. Douglas Melamed, Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent
Damages, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 385, 465 (2016) (“Current patent infringement remedies do
not adequately further the key incentives of the patent system: patentees’ incentive to invent,
firms’ incentive to innovate and develop new products, and the incentive for patent holders
and firms to negotiate patent licenses ex ante.”); Sichelman, supra note 39, at 519 (“Patent
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Professor Bernard Chao similarly argued that infringement
should be thought of as a “continuum,” where the infringing product
may be exactly like the disclosed embodiments, a small variation
thereof, or a substantial departure therefrom—and everything in
between—commensurate with the potential claim scope.48 Remedies
can be tailored to reflect this continuum such that “[a] company that
does precisely what is described in the specification owes a greater
debt to the patentee than a company that modifies the invention in
some unforeseen ways or adds its own contributions.”49
Although doctrines like enablement, written description, and
claim construction can serve to limit the reach of patent claims beyond
the specification’s disclosure, Professor Chao noted that such outcomes
are undesirable because they are binary—the result can only be
valid/invalid or infringed/not infringed.50 Employing remedies for this
purpose, however, allows for a more flexible approach that fine-tunes
the consequences of infringement by considering not only what the
patentee should recover but what the infringer should retain.51 The
result is “a framework that adjusts the amount of damages by the
proximity the infringer’s use has to the use envisioned by the
inventor.”52
Professor Chao’s reasoning applies with particular force to
independent-dependent claim pairs, which by definition occupy
relatively outer and inner portions, respectively, of the continuum. His
theory was justified by public benefits and innovation incentives with
little concern for the private compensation to the patentee.53 But if
infringement of a dependent claim warrants stronger relief because of
law, on the other hand, is not designed to remedy private wrongs. Rather, its major aim is to
promote innovation. Nonetheless, patent remedies mirror traditional tort law remedies by
attempting to restore the patentee to the status quo ante—namely, the state of the world in
which there is no infringement of the patent.” (footnotes omitted)).
48 Chao, supra note 36, at 1387–88.
49 Id. at 1389.
50 Id. at 1376.
51 Id. at 1404 (“Patentees clearly deserve more compensation when infringement
looks just like what the patentee invented. Correspondingly, infringers deserve to retain
more of their own proceeds when they provide larger contributions.”).
52 Id. at 1404–05; id. at 1362 (“Under this theory, the patentee’s remedy diminishes
when the nature of the infringement looks less and less like what the specification describes.”).
53 Id. at 1362 (“This theory is unconcerned with what the patentee lost and
instead focuses on the relative contribution the patent made to the infringing device. By
rethinking patent remedies in terms of disclosure principles, the proposal described in this
Article tailors the remedy to better address the infringement continuum. Consequently,
this proposal improves on existing doctrines that only offer binary outcomes.”); id. at 1398
(“This Article takes the public interest more seriously and argues that patent law should
replace the current bifurcated lost-profits/reasonable-royalty framework with a single
scheme that is primarily based on the proximity the infringement has to the actual
invention. Under this proposal, the award a patentee would receive would more closely
measure what it actually contributed to the infringing product.”); id. at 1399 (“The reason
why lost profits systematically overcompensates patentees is because the remedy is not
designed to promote innovation.”); id. at 1413 (“[T]his proposal will optimize incentives for
both early innovators and those that would build on basic technology.”).
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the patent disclosure’s larger contribution to the infringing product,
that result may often be supportable by the compensatory view of
damages as well, at least to the extent the patentee also practices the
core invention as disclosed. Even Professor Chao’s point is not to
eliminate compensation for patent owners, but to eliminate
overcompensation for benefits not attributable to the infringement.54
As he puts it, “[t]he question should not be: how does the law make the
patentee whole? But rather, what compensation is needed to properly
incentivize innovation?”55 The following sub-parts make the case that
the inquiry as to proper incentives should consider the relative claim
scope, and dependent claims in particular, in all cases where only some
subset of asserted claims might ultimately be both valid and infringed.
B.

Compensatory Damages and the Assessment of Pecuniary
Harm

Patent owners who prove infringement are entitled to
recover “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but
in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer.” 56 As the Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed, those damages should put the patent owner in the
pecuniary position it would have been had the infringement not
occurred.57
On the surface, the above-discussed notion that dependent
claims may ever warrant more damages than their independent
counterparts may seem counterintuitive, as the broadest claims are
often viewed as the most valuable because they include the most
potential infringement (or prospects)58 and thus reflect the largest
degree of market control. In a market value sense (e.g., to prospective
purchasers of a patent), that is a legitimate viewpoint, and
dependent claims might be properly viewed as secondary—mere
54 Id. at 1404 (“Patentees clearly deserve more compensation when infringement
looks just like what the patentee invented.”); id. at 1397 (“[B]oth the current lost profits
and reasonable royalty frameworks overcompensate the patentee.”).
55 Id. at 1405.
56 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
57 WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2139 (2018)
(“Under § 284, damages are ‘adequate’ to compensate for infringement when they ‘plac[e]
[the patent owner] in as good a position as he would have been in’ if the patent had not
been infringed. Specifically, a patent owner is entitled to recover ‘the difference between
[its] pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what [its] condition would have been
if the infringement had not occurred.’” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first
quoting General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655 (1983), then quoting Aro
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964)).
58 Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 871 (1990) (explaining that the prospect theory of broad
patenting pre-commercialization “amounts to granting rights over an unexplored pool, with
the right-holder being permitted to charge for access to various parts of the pool. Thus the
inefficiencies associated with rivalrous uncoordinated invention, as in the fishing or race
models, can be avoided.” (footnote omitted)).
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hedges against the potential failure of the independent claim or
pawns for claim construction purposes. 59 Indeed, the narrower
dependent claim may also be comparatively easier to design around,
diminishing the cost of using a suitable noninfringing alternative.60
Of course, should the broader independent claims fall under a
validity challenge, the dependent claims may become the only thing
valuable about the patent.
Often, however, the dependent claims encompass the
preferred implementations of the invention, as well as the patentee’s
commercial products. 61 In those cases, the infringement of the
dependent claims may strike closer to the heart of the patent owner’s
economic interests in exclusivity. Infringement of such a dependent
claim may warrant greater damages than infringement of the
corresponding independent claim. By analogy to trespass, there is a
marked difference in the harm caused by entering someone’s lawn
versus their home, or even their home’s curtilage, 62 where the
exclusive interests are more potent. 63 Lost profits recovery, for
example, must be causally related to the infringement, showing that
the patent owner would have made the sales but for the
infringement 64 —a showing that would be more compelling if the
See supra Part II.
See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350-51
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[A] fair and accurate reconstruction of the ‘but for’ market also must take
into account, where relevant, alternative actions the infringer foreseeably would have
undertaken had he not infringed. Without the infringing product, a rational would-be
infringer is likely to offer an acceptable noninfringing alternative, if available, to compete
with the patent owner rather than leave the market altogether.”); Seaman, supra note 38,
at 1667 (“[A] reasonable royalty for patent infringement should not exceed the accused
infringer’s expected costs of adopting an acceptable noninfringing substitute.”).
61 See supra Part II.
62 Cf. Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670–71 (2018) (“[T]he Fourth
Amendment’s protection of curtilage has long been black letter law. When it comes to the
Fourth Amendment, the home is first among equals. At the Amendment’s very core stands
the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion. To give full practical effect to that right, curtilage—the area
immediately surrounding and associated with the home—is considered to be part of the home
itself for Fourth Amendment purposes. The protection afforded the curtilage is essentially a
protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to the home, both
physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most heightened. . . . The
conception defining the curtilage is familiar enough that it is easily understood from one’s
daily experience. Just like the front porch, side garden, or area outside the front window, a
driveway enclosure that constitutes an area adjacent to the home and to which the activity of
home life extends is properly considered curtilage [that is subject to a reasonable expectation
of privacy].” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
63 Cf. Chao, supra note 36, at 1363 (2014) (“Although reasonable minds may
disagree on how far into the continuum a patent should reach, no one should dispute that
some kinds of infringements should be treated more seriously than others.”).
64 Siemens Med. Sols. USA, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Ceramics & Plastics, Inc., 637
F.3d 1269, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“To recover lost profits, the patent owner must show
causation in fact, establishing that but for the infringement, he would have made additional
profits.” (quoting Wechsler v. Macke Int’l Trade, Inc., 486 F.3d 1286, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007));
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978) (“To
obtain as damages the profits on sales he would have made absent the infringement, i.e., the
59

60
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infringed claim was a dependent claim drawn specifically to cover the
patent owner’s commercial product.
When the issue of relative damages among independent and
dependent claims has come up, however, the Federal Circuit has
surprisingly said that dependent claims do not even warrant a
damages assessment distinct from that of the underlying
independent claims. First, in Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc.,
the patentee asserted both independent and dependent claims but
failed to secure an infringement verdict or post-trial judgment as to
any of the asserted claims.65 In affirming the judgment, the Federal
Circuit expressed some confusion as to why the patentee even
bothered bringing up the dependent claims, reasoning that the
independent claims were all that mattered, even for damages:
Because a reversal on appeal on one independent claim would give
Wahpeton all it needs for victory, submission of the infringement issue
on a plethora of dependent claims in Wahpeton’s motion and appeal is
difficult to understand. Infringement of an independent claim would
result in the same damage award as would infringement of all claims
dependent thereon and non-infringement of an independent claim
carries with it non-infringement of all claims dependent thereon.66

Similarly, in CollegeNet, Inc. v. ApplyYourself, Inc., the patentee
asserted a combination of independent and dependent claims, some
of which were found infringed on summary judgment and the rest
of which were found infringed by a jury after trial.67 The district
court denied the defendant’s post-trial motion for a new trial on the
jury’s findings as to certain dependent claims, and the Federal
Circuit affirmed again by treating those dependent claims as
inconsequential, even for damages purposes:
ApplyYourself also challenges the district court’s refusal to grant a
new trial on the jury’s finding of infringement as to various dependent
claims of the ‘278 patent. However, having affirmed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment of infringement of [other, including two
independent,] claims . . . of the ‘278 patent, there is no reason for this
court to reach this argument. After all, infringement of even a single
claim entitles a patentee to damages. Therefore, even if the district
court had concluded that the infringement verdicts on [dependent]
claims 6–8 and 27 of the ‘278 patent were against the clear weight of
the evidence, the damages awarded on the ‘278 patent would still
stand.68

sales made by the infringer, a patent owner must prove: (1) demand for the patented product,
(2) absence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes, (3) his manufacturing and marketing
capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of the profit he would have made.”).
65 Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1552–53 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
66 Id. at 1552 n.10 (emphasis added).
67 CollegeNet, Inc. v. ApplyYourself, Inc., 418 F.3d 1225, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
68 Id.
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This sentiment, that dependent claims do not matter for damages, has
been echoed by district courts as well—e.g., “[t]he damages are the
same whether there is infringement of one or one hundred claims.”69
Finally, sometimes in this context the Federal Circuit has made a
more nuanced point, expressing a similar view that the dependent
claims do not affect damages but attributing that to the parties’ or the
record’s failure to evaluate damages claim by claim.70
When courts and parties so fail to value the claims separately,
and especially where the patent owner seeks a reasonable royalty (as is
typical) 71 instead of lost profits, 72 the damages calculation largely
collapses into an exercise in valuing the broadest claims at issue or the
“invention” more generally. 73 The dependent claims are viewed as
redundant and adding nothing of substance. 74 That perspective is
69 Total Containment, Inc. v. Environ Prods., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1355, 1394 n.20
(E.D. Pa. 1995) (“The court knows of no reason for asserting the numerous dependent
claims that have been asserted in this action. The damages are the same whether there is
infringement of one or one hundred claims. Damages are not multiplied by the number of
claims infringed.”); see also Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 03-440 S, 2007 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 97491, at *18 (D.R.I. Oct. 19, 2007) (“It is hornbook patent law that
infringement of even a single claim entitles a patentee to damages.”), aff’d 290 F. App’x
337, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16938 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
70 See, e.g., TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 516 F.3d 1290, 1312 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (affirming infringement finding as to some but not all claims and explaining that
“[b]ecause the damages calculation at trial was not predicated on the infringement of
particular claims, and because we have upheld the jury’s verdict that all of the accused devices
infringe the software claims, we affirm the damages award entered by the district court”);
Hartness Int’l, Inc. v. Simplimatic Eng’g Co., 819 F.2d 1100, 1108 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“On this
record, it does not appear that the award of damages would be increased even if [dependent]
claim 3 were found to be infringed; therefore, a remand for this purpose is unnecessary.”).
71 Seaman, supra note 38, at 1667 (“[A] reasonable royalty recently has become
the most commonly employed method for calculating patent infringement damages,
supplementing or replacing the traditional remedy of the patentee’s lost profits.”).
72 Notably, there is some relevant blurring between reasonable royalty and
lost profits doctrine. See Lemley, supra note 38, at 674 (“Patent damages are supposed
to compensate patent owners for their losses, putting them back in the world they
would have inhabited but for infringement. The lost profits analysis contains
sophisticated economic tools to help courts calculate that but-for world. Unfortunately,
the perfect has too often been the enemy of the good, relegating a number of lost profits
cases to the rather less economically sophisticated analysis of reasonable royalties.
Worse, the importation of concepts from lost profits into reasonable royalty analysis,
and the fear of undercompensating deserving patent owners that should have been
able to prove lost profits, has led to systematic distortions in the reasonable royalty
structure that overcompensate nonmanufacturing patent owners.”).
73 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (listing various factors for assessing a “reasonable royalty” measure of
damages, such factors purporting to approximate the value of a license to use the patent
and/or invention overall).
74 See, e.g., Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1552 n.10 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (“Like many, if not most, dependent claims, most of those present here present
minute structural details but were allowed because they contain all the limitations of
allowed claims from which they depend.”); Univ. of Pittsburgh of the Commonwealth Sys.
of Higher Educ. v. Varian Med. Sys., 561 F. App’x 934, 947 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Varian asserts,
nonetheless, that damages should not turn on claim draftsmanship such that the owner of
an improvement patent may deliberately add dependent claims directed to unimproved
conventional devices to expand the royalty base. We do not disagree. But, Georgia-Pacific
Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), addresses that
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inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s insistence that patent
infringement damages are supposed to be compensatory—i.e., money to
offset actual harm suffered by the patent owner that is caused by the
specific acts of infringement,75 not payments for the privilege to use the
entire scope of all the patent claims.76
specific problem by requiring the patentee to provide tangible evidence regarding the
relative value of his or her invention in combination with, but distinct from, any
conventional elements recited in the claim. A number of the Georgia-Pacific factors are
directed to that specific point and require the jury to reward the inventor only for the value
of his or her innovation. In other words, if the claimed invention only adds an incremental
value to the conventional element(s), the damages awarded must also be so limited. But, if
the claimed invention adds significant value to the conventional element(s), the damages
award may reflect that value.”).
75 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall
award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event
less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together
with interest and costs as fixed by the court.”); WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.,
138 S. Ct. 2129, 2139 (2018) (“Under § 284, damages are ‘adequate’ to compensate for
infringement when they ‘plac[e] [the patent owner] in as good a position as he would have
been in’ if the patent had not been infringed. Specifically, a patent owner is entitled to
recover ‘the difference between [its] pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what
[its] condition would have been if the infringement had not occurred.’” (alterations in
original) (citations omitted) (first quoting General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S.
648, 655 (1983), then quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S.
476, 507 (1964))); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507
(1964) (“[T]he present statutory rule is that only ‘damages’ may be recovered. These have
been defined by this Court as ‘compensation for the pecuniary loss he [the patentee] has
suffered from the infringement, without regard to the question whether the defendant has
gained or lost by his unlawful acts.’ They have been said to constitute ‘the difference
between his pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his condition would have
been if the infringement had not occurred.’ . . . ‘[The] question [is] primarily: had the
Infringer not infringed, what would Patent Holder-Licensee have made?’” (alterations in
original) (citations omitted) (first quoting Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 582 (1895), then
quoting Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536, 552 (1886), then quoting Livesay
Window Co. v. Livesay Indus., Inc., 251 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 1958)).
76 See Daniel Harris Brean, Ending Unreasonable Royalties: Why Nominal
Damages Are Adequate to Compensate Patent Assertion Entities for Infringement, 39 VT. L.
REV. 867, 923 (2015) (“There can be no substantial recovery for harmless patent infringement
[under § 284 or Aro].”); Oscar Liivak, When Nominal is Reasonable: Damages for the
Unpracticed Patent, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1031, 1067 (2015) (“Today cognizable harm is presumed
for every case of infringement. That presumption is just not supportable.”); Doug Rendleman,
Measurement of Restitution: Coordinating Restitution with Compensatory Damages and
Punitive Damages, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973, 975–76 (2011) (“The court will base the
plaintiff ’ s recovery of compensatory damages on her loss. . . . [Conversely,] [t]he court’s
baseline guide to restitution is the defendant’s gain, not the plaintiff ’ s loss.”). At least where
the fact of compensatory harm has been established, some restitution principles may assist
in the calculation of the amount of a reasonable royalty. See John M. Golden & Karen E.
Sandrik, A Restitution Perspective on Reasonable Royalties, 36 REV. LITIG. 335, 345–46 (2017)
(“[C]ourts have explicitly recognized that the magnitude of an infringer’s profits can inform a
court’s assessment of the proper size of a damages award, including a reasonable royalty
award. . . . Among the fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors commonly cited as potential bases for a
court’s assessment of reasonable royalty damages, at least two point to consideration of an
infringer’s profits by directing courts to take into account ‘[t]he established profitability of the
product made under the patent’ and ‘any evidence probative of the value of [the infringer’s]
use’ of the invention.” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)); see also Liivak, supra note
76, at 1064 (“[R]easonable royalties developed to allow substantial damages where the fact of
harm was proved and the amount of harm could not be fit into the stringent confines of lost
profits or established royalties.”).
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The difference may be dramatic in some cases. The actual
pecuniary harm caused by infringement that practices a patentee’s
dependent-claim commercial embodiment, for example, may be far
greater than the actual pecuniary harm caused by practicing a version
of the invention never contemplated by the inventor that is
nonetheless within the broad penumbra of the independent claim.77
This is because the products that practice the narrower claim are
necessarily a subset of the products encompassed by the broader claim.
If the patentee and infringer both offer products in the smaller subset,
it is more likely that a sale made by the infringer is the actual and
proximate cause that a sale was a loss to the patentee. By contrast, an
infringing product that incorporates a dependent feature may not be
as directly competitive with a patentee’s product that omits that
feature—the infringer’s customer in that instance might not even
consider the patentee’s product a suitable alternative.
To be sure, the Federal Circuit has long held, in other
contexts,78 that proximate cause can place a reasonable limit on the
extent of compensatory damages liability, as measured by objective
foreseeability:
We believe that under § 284 of the patent statute, the balance between
full compensation, which is the meaning that the Supreme Court has
attributed to the statute, and the reasonable limits of liability
encompassed by general principles of law can best be viewed in terms
of reasonable, objective foreseeability. If a particular injury was or
should have been reasonably foreseeable by an infringing competitor
in the relevant market, broadly defined, that injury is generally
compensable absent a persuasive reason to the contrary.79

But the court has also indicated that foreseeability is not
the sole measure by which damages might be properly limited.
Proximate cause, it explained, is essentially a “judicial tool[ ] used
to limit legal responsibility for the consequences of one’s conduct
that are too remote to justify compensation.”80 As such, the limits of
recovery should “be determined on the facts of each case upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy and
77 See Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (considering, for reasonable
royalty determination, factors including “[t]he licensor’s established policy and marketing
program to maintain his patent monopoly . . . . [t]he commercial relationship between the
licensor and licensee . . . . [and] the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a
generator of sales of his non-patented items.”).
78 Patentees have been able to recover lost profits for the sales of at least some
products not covered by the patent(s) in suit but that bear a strong functional relationship to the
products that are covered by the patent(s) in suit (essentially, the combined patented and nonpatented products must make a single operable unit). See, e.g., Micro Chem., Inc. v. Lextron,
Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96
F.3d 1409, 1414 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109,
1118 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
79 Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1546.
80 Id.
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precedent.” 81 As applied to claim scope in general and to
independent/dependent claim pairs in particular, this kind of
nuance in the damages analysis would be a welcome addition.
The Supreme Court may have even recently signaled its
receptiveness to placing more emphasis on causation as a limit on
patent damages. In WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.,82
the Court held that infringement under Section 271(f)(2) of the
Patent Act, which prohibits supplying a material component of a
patented device from the United States for assembly of the device
abroad, 83 entitles the patentee to recover damages for foreign lost
profits that result from the infringement.84 In a footnote, the sevenJustice majority explained that “[i]n reaching this holding, we do not
address the extent to which other doctrines, such as proximate cause,
could limit or preclude damages in particular cases.”85 This comment
appears to have been at least partly in response to criticism made in
dissent by Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Breyer). Justice
Gorsuch suggested that the majority’s decision would allow any
single domestic act of infringement (i.e., exporting a material
component for assembly of a device abroad) to open the floodgates to
recover profits derived from all uses of that device worldwide.86

81 Id. (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 42, at 279 (5th ed. 1984). In practice, however, the Federal Circuit has been criticized for
limiting its proximate cause doctrine to a foreseeability test, for applying that test inconsistently,
and for the resulting damages awards being over-inclusive. See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook,
Extraterritoriality and Proximate Cause After WesternGeco, 21 YALE J.L. & TECH. 189, 224
(2019) (“[T]he court ignored . . . considerations [such as justice, policy, and precedent], instead
embracing a simplistic test of foreseeability. The court, at times, has built upon this
foreseeability principle to afford broad compensatory damages to patent holders.”).
82 WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018).
83 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (2012) (“Whoever without authority supplies or causes to
be supplied in or from the United States any component of a patented invention that is
especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component
is uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or adapted and
intending that such component will be combined outside of the United States in a manner
that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall
be liable as an infringer.”).
84 WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2138. (“The conduct in this case that is relevant to
that focus clearly occurred in the United States, as it was ION’s domestic act of supplying
the components that infringed WesternGeco’s patents. Thus, the lost-profits damages that
were awarded to WesternGeco were a domestic application of § 284.”).
85 Id. at 2139 n.3.
86 Id. at 2142 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Any suggestion that § 271(f)(2) provides
protection against foreign uses . . . . would threaten to ‘conver[t] a single act of supply from
the United States into a springboard for liability.’ Here, for example, supplying a single
infringing product from the United States would make ION responsible for any foreseeable
harm its customers cause by using the product to compete against WesternGeco worldwide,
even though WesternGeco’s U.S. patent doesn’t protect it from such competition. It’s some
springboard, too. The harm flowing from foreign uses in this case appears to outstrip wildly
the harm inflicted by ION’s domestic production: the jury awarded $93.4 million in lost profits
from uses in 10 foreign surveys but only $12.5 million in royalties for 2,500 U. S.-made
products.” (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 456 (2007))).
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It is significant for the majority to hint—over this criticism—
that causation might also be in play. As Tim Holbrook explained shortly
after WesternGeco was decided, “[a]side from punting on the issue, this
footnote does implicitly suggest that proximate cause and
extraterritoriality concerns are properly viewed as distinct concerns.”87
The parallel role of causation was discussed in some depth during oral
argument, which included specific reference to an amicus brief by
Professor Stephen Yelderman that argued that doctrines like causationin-fact and proximate cause were well suited to serve as limiting
principles for damages.88 The footnote, in context, would thus appear to
leave the door open for renewed focus on damages causation in
WesternGeco and future cases.89
The Federal Circuit may have to address this causation issue
sooner rather than later. Judge Stark in the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware recently took the position that Section
271(a), which applies to infringement activities entirely “within the
United States,” permits recovery of damages suffered abroad under
WesternGeco. 90 This is a generous reading of WesternGeco, which
interpreted Section 271(f)(1)—a statute that expressly targets conduct
leading to extraterritorial infringement.91 Without a proximate causebased limit, the opened floodgates that troubled the dissent in
WesternGeco will be compounded dramatically if all acts of domestic
infringement allowed for recovery of foreign damages. Given the farreaching implications of that decision, Judge Stark went the extra step

87 Timothy Holbrook, WesternGeco’s Implications for Patent Law and Beyond,
PATENTLY-O (June 24, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/06/holbrook-westernge
cos-implications.html [https://perma.cc/V5A2-NH6Q].
88 Id. (“Some of the amicus briefs at the Court looked at the damages issue
from the perspective of proximate cause. Professor Yelderman submitted an amicus brief
that drew specific reference at oral argument, focusing extensively on proximate cause
as it relates to damages. Similarly, the amici brief I submitted also raised issues of
proximate cause, particularly in this case where the lost profits were for foregone
services and not for lost sales of the invention.”); Brief for Law Professor Stephen
Yelderman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15–26, WesternGeco LLC v. ION
Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018) (No. 16-1011), https://www.supremecourt.gov/
DocketPDF/16/16-1011/37296/20180301183046990_16-1011%20Amicus%20Brief%
20for%20WesternGeco%20LLC%20v.%20ION%20Geophysical%20Corporation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/79WJ-U49F].
89 As Tim Holbrook explained, the Federal Circuit has often taken a broad view
of proximate cause in patent damages, and that “[t]he Supreme Court’s gesture to
proximate cause may be a sign that it is time for the Federal Circuit to revisit the
capaciousness of its doctrine.” Holbrook, supra note 81, at 226.
90 Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., No. 04-1371-LPS, 2018
WL 4804685, at *1 (D. Del. Oct. 4, 2018) (“Fairchild has identified no persuasive reason to conclude
that the interpretation of § 284 should differ here from what was available in WesternGeco II just
because the type of infringing conduct alleged is different. . . . Section 271(a) vindicates domestic
interests no less than Section 271(f).”(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
91 Tim Holbrook criticized the decision as being based on reasoning that was
“relatively thin, with no robust consideration of the focus of § 271(a)” and its clear domestic
focus. Holbrook, supra note 81, at 219.
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of certifying the issue for immediate interlocutory appeal to the Federal
Circuit.92
If there is to be an enhanced role for causation in patent
damages, it should also influence the assessment of independentdependent claim pairs as discussed above. An infringement of a
dependent claim might be of the type that actually and proximately
causes harm suffered by the patent owner (as in the case of a
dependent claim that is directed to the patentee’s commercial
product), while infringement only of the independent claim might have
a more tenuous causal relationship to the patentee’s alleged harm. To
the extent damages are designed to be compensatory, those two
infringements cannot be assumed to cause the same amount of
damages.
C.

Enhanced Damages and Deterring Willful Infringement

Beyond compensatory damages, Section 284 of the Patent
Act permits courts to increase damages up to three times 93 in
instances where the infringement was willful. The term “willful” is
nowhere in the statute, but comes from the common law,94 where
Section 284 has been interpreted to allow district courts to use
enhanced damages to punish a wide variety of deliberate
misconduct by infringers.95
In cases that involve such misconduct, infringement of a
dependent claim may be more culpable than infringement of a
broader independent claim. The doctrine has long recognized that for
a willfulness finding, inter alia: (1) the accused infringer must have
known about the patent;96 and (2) an accused infringer’s “copying” of
the patentee’s ideas and designs is a proper factor to consider.97 An
Power Integrations, Inc., 2018 WL 4804685, at *3.
35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012) (providing discretion that “the court may increase the
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed”).
94 Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1931 (2016) (“The pertinent
text of § 284 provides simply that ‘the court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed.’ That language contains no explicit limit or condition, and we have
emphasized that the ‘word “may” clearly connotes discretion.’” (citations omitted) (first quoting
35 U.S.C. § 284, then quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136 (2005)); see
also id. at 1928–30 (discussing history of enhanced damages based on various misconduct).
95 Id. at 1932 (“The sort of conduct warranting enhanced damages has been variously
described in our cases as willful, wanton, malicious, bad-faith, deliberate, consciously wrongful,
flagrant, or—indeed—characteristic of a pirate. District courts enjoy discretion in deciding
whether to award enhanced damages, and in what amount.”(citation omitted)).
96 WBIP, LLC v. Kohler Co., 829 F.3d 1317, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Knowledge of the
patent alleged to be willfully infringed continues to be a prerequisite to enhanced damages.”).
97 Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1414 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“[O]ne of the relevant factors [of willfulness] is ‘whether the infringer deliberately
copied the ideas or design of another.’”); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 827 n.7 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (“‘Ideas’ and ‘design’ would encompass, for example, copying the commercial
embodiment, not merely the elements of a patent claim.”); see also Christopher A. Cotropia &
Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1439–40 (2009) (“Because
copying is not an element of patent cases, there is no specific requirement that plaintiffs plead
92

93
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important caveat is that the patent system simultaneously wants to
discourage copying but encourage “design-around” innovation, 98
which can sometimes be a fine line to draw. Good faith efforts to
design around might ultimately infringe and bad faith efforts to
infringe might not succeed. Nonetheless, because the dependent
claims are narrower with more concrete details than their
independent counterparts, it is less likely—all else being equal—that
a dependent claim was unknowingly infringed or was being designed
around rather than copied. Put another way, infringement of a
narrower dependent claim beyond infringement of the broader
independent claim could constitute circumstantial evidence of intent
to infringe.
To illustrate by analogy, imagine that the visual depiction of
the claims covering the rope/pulley/lever apparatus discussed above
(see supra Part I) was a dart board:

Claim 2
Claim 1
Claim 

Designing around claims 1–3 is like to trying to throw a dart
as close as possible to the board without hitting it. In that context,
one could imagine a good-faith effort to throw a dart that will hit
just outside the board nonetheless ending up hitting the outer the
periphery of the board. But if one hits the smaller regions of claims
or prove that the defendant has copied the invention, either from the patent itself or from the
plaintiff ’ s commercial embodiment of the invention. Nonetheless, there is good reason to
believe that plaintiffs will have strong incentives to plead and prove copying in cases where it
exists. First, the fact that the defendant copied an invention from the plaintiff strongly
suggests that the defendant’s product infringes the patent; while parties can and do fight
about the meaning of patent claims, if the defendant actually derived its product from the
plaintiff ’ s, it is likely to fit within any reasonable interpretation of most patent claims.
Second, if the defendant copied from the plaintiff, that fact is likely to provide strong evidence
that the defendant was a willful as opposed to an innocent infringer, and therefore to justify
an award of enhanced damages for infringement.”).
98 7 Chisum on Patents § 20.03[4][b][v][G] (2019) (“Tension persists in willful
infringement case law between two conflicting desires: (1) that of discouraging improper
‘copying’ of patentees’ technology—directly from the patent disclosure or indirectly from
the patentees’ commercial embodiments, and (2) that of not discouraging ‘designing around’
patented technology.”).
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2 and 3, it is harder to believe one was not aiming for them (or at
least somewhere on the board).
Given the Supreme Court’s recent guidance in Halo
Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. that the willfulness
determination should be flexible and discretionary, courts are
ostensibly entitled to consider the type and scope of the claim as a
proper factor in the willfulness analysis in this manner.99 Indeed, the
Supreme Court recognized that culpability is not binary but lies along
a spectrum, holding expressly that “Section 284 allows district courts
to punish the full range of culpable behavior,” even if the Court itself
believes that “such punishment should generally be reserved for
egregious cases typified by willful misconduct.”100
Beyond the willfulness determination itself that is usually
made by a jury, courts may also use the degree of the infringer’s
culpability in deciding whether and how much of an enhanced
damages award is appropriate. 101 The willfulness and enhanced
damages inquiries tend to have substantial overlap, especially after
Halo when egregiousness seems to be the new overarching
benchmark.102 As Professor Dmitry Karshtedt explained, courts can
and have scaled enhanced damages awards in proportion to the
culpability of the infringer:
There is a great deal of precedent for awarding lower enhanced
damages where the defendant acted in a way that is “worse than
negligent but less than malicious,” in the old “intentional harm” sense
of “malice.” Judges assessing enhanced damages may well decide to
follow this distinction, generally awarding, say, an amount closer to
99 Halo Elecs., 136 S. Ct. at 1933–34 (“Section 284 allows district courts to punish
the full range of culpable behavior. Yet none of this is to say that enhanced damages must
follow a finding of egregious misconduct. As with any exercise of discretion, courts should
continue to take into account the particular circumstances of each case in deciding whether
to award damages, and in what amount. Section 284 permits district courts to exercise their
discretion in a manner free from the inelastic constraints of the Seagate test. Consistent with
nearly two centuries of enhanced damages under patent law, however, such punishment
should generally be reserved for egregious cases typified by willful misconduct.”).
100 Id. at 1933–34 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1932 (“District courts enjoy
discretion in deciding whether to award enhanced damages, and in what amount.”).
101 While juries currently decide matters of willfulness, judges decide whether such a
finding warrants any damages enhancement. Daniel Harris Brean & Bryan P. Clark, Casting
Aspersions in Patent Trials, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 145, 160–61 (2017). The legal footing and wisdom
of this jury involvement has been questioned. See id. at 204 (“Neither willfulness nor bad-faith
enforcement have clear jury-trial rights in statutes, direct historical antecedents, or analogous
historical contexts. Juries are generally well-suited to decide matters of culpability, but these
specific culpability issues are probably better resolved by judges.”).
102 Dmitry Karshtedt, Enhancing Patent Damages, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1427, 1531–
32 (2018) (“Whatever the exact relationship between the jury willfulness standard and the trial
judge enhancement standard, the inquiries overlap to some extent. For example, a good-faith
belief of invalidity or noninfringement is likely relevant to the former as well as the latter, even
for courts that have replaced or supplemented the Read factors with the more amorphous
‘egregiousness’ determination.” (footnote omitted)); id. at 1531 (“Although it is difficult to draw
generalizations less than two years after Halo was decided, trial judges appear to treat
egregiousness as a kind of overarching requirement for awarding enhanced damages that they
must enforce after the patentee proves to the jury that the infringer acted willfully.”).
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double damages for the former but closer to treble damages for the
latter. To aid in this analysis, a jury could be asked to indicate
whether the infringement was reckless or intentional on a special
verdict form, or a judge could decide whether the facts supporting a
jury’s decision to open the door for enhanced damages allow for the
conclusion of intentional conduct or that which is merely reckless.103

To the extent that infringement of a dependent claim indicates a
comparatively greater degree of culpability, that factor would
support a comparatively greater enhancement of damages.
Finally, while ordinary damages are intended to compensate
for the patentee’s private harms, 104 enhancing those damages
warrants even more consideration of societal harms to further the
particular deterrence goals of damages enhancement.105 For example,
choosing to infringe patents can be economically inefficient in a variety
of ways (e.g., generating deadweight litigation costs), which should be
avoided where feasible.106 In some cases, those inefficiencies may be
more pronounced for a party’s willful infringement of dependent
claims—e.g., a narrowly-defined feature of interest is easier to find in
patent searches for purposes of ex ante licensing, and is easier to
design around as well.107 More broadly, the public value of the higher
quality disclosure and relative claim precision that tends to be
associated with dependent claims, discussed above, may be especially
significant to consider in the context of willfulness and enhanced
damages. If intentional infringement offends public policy and
103 Id. at 1533–34 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1533 (“[T]he current structure
gives the judge the ability to modulate the amount of enhanced damages based on the
severity of the infringer’s conduct, considerations of efficiency and deterrence specific to the
circumstances of the case, and, perhaps, even based on the judge’s conclusion that the
compensatory damages award is sufficiently severe that little or no enhancement is needed
to ensure that the infringer is ‘punished.’”).
104 WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 138 S. Ct. 2129, 2139 (2018)
(“Under § 284, damages are ‘adequate’ to compensate for infringement when they ‘plac[e]
[the patent owner] in as good a position as he would have been in’ if the patent had not
been infringed. Specifically, a patent owner is entitled to recover ‘the difference between
[its] pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what [its] condition would have been
if the infringement had not occurred.’” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (first
quoting General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648, 655 (1983), then quoting Aro
Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964))).
105 See Karshtedt, supra note 102, at 1541 (“[E]nhanced damages are, in fact, one
remedy for which some consideration of societal harms, as opposed to merely private ones,
is possible even presently in civil litigation.”); see also id. at 1533.
106 Id. at 1510 (“The goals of patent remedies should be, on the whole, to encourage
efficient conduct, however defined, not to mete out punishment that would preclude
retribution and self-help.”).
107 See id. at 1519–25 (proposing that the degree of patent searching and analysis
employed by a defendant, in the context of the particular case, should be considered as part
of the enhanced damages assessment); id. at 1528 (suggesting that even for intentional
infringers, efficiency considerations matter, and that a “fact-finder could evaluate whether
the defendant was already ‘locked-in’ to using the infringing product, or whether there was a
reason that negotiating a license would generate high transaction costs. If the costs of
avoiding infringement in these circumstances were high, a finding of willfulness may be
unwarranted” (footnotes omitted)).
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deserves punishment, it is especially offensive to infringe the claims
most clearly and closely tied to the patent’s express teachings—
teachings that the patent system as a whole is fundamentally
designed to channel into it in exchange for the patent protection.108
D.

Injunctions and Equitable Harm

Finally, the scope and type of claim may also have relevance
to the propriety of injunctive relief, particularly as it relates to the
patentee’s burden of showing irreparable harm.109 As with damages,
infringement of a dependent claim being practiced by the patent
owner may cause harm more central to the patentee’s commercial
activity and provide a more compelling case for injunctive relief.
Because patents provide the right to exclude others from
practicing the invention,110 courts have the power to issue injunctions
upon findings of infringement.111 Deeming injunctions essential to the
right to exclude, the Federal Circuit used to presume that an injunction
would be entered whenever infringement was found.112 Then, in eBay v.
MercExchange, the Supreme Court rejected that categorical approach
in favor a flexible framework that, in every case, considers four
equitable factors:
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking
a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court
may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such
as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff

108 See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent system
represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public
disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a
limited period of time.”); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)
(“In consideration of [the invention’s] disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community,
the patent is granted.”) Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (“When a
patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated to the general public and those
especially skilled in the trade, such additions to the general store of knowledge are of such
importance to the public weal that the Federal Government is willing to pay the high price of 17
years of exclusive use for its disclosure, which disclosure, it is assumed, will stimulate ideas and
the eventual development of further significant advances in the art.”).
109 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
110 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (“Every patent shall contain a short title of the
invention and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States.”).
111 Id. § 283 (“The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any
right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”).
112 MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(“Because the ‘right to exclude recognized in a patent is but the essence of the concept of
property,’ the general rule is that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and
validity have been adjudged.”), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.113

After this landmark decision, although injunctions decreased
significantly in frequency for noncompetitors and nonpracticing
entities, 114 patentees that can show competitive injury are still
generally able to secure injunctive relief.115
More pointedly, since eBay, competition between the
parties has become a new benchmark for patent injunctions. The
overwhelming majority of injunctions granted after eBay have
involved the defendant being a competitor of the patentee.116 But
even non-practicing patent assertion entities (PAEs), which are
generally denied injunctions, have a statistically better chance of
getting injunctions than other PAEs if they merely tried to be a
113 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391; see also id. at 393–94 (“But traditional equitable
principles do not permit such broad classifications. . . . Just as the District Court erred in
its categorical denial of injunctive relief, the Court of Appeals erred in its categorical grant
of such relief.”); id. at 394 (“We hold only that the decision whether to grant or deny
injunctive relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and that such
discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional principles of equity, in patent
disputes no less than in other cases governed by such standards.”).
114 See generally Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent
Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949 (2016). Ryan Holte ascribes
this shift, in large part, to the influence of Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in eBay,
which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. Ryan T. Holte, The
Misinterpretation of eBay v. MercExchange and Why: An Analysis of Case History, Precedent,
and Parties, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 677, 721 (2015) (“One reason for the change in jurisprudence
regarding issuance of permanent injunctions post-eBay, is that district court judges are citing
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence to support holdings that deny injunctions.”); eBay, 547 U.S. at
396–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]rial courts should bear in mind that in many instances
the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of the patent holder present
considerations quite unlike earlier cases. An industry has developed in which firms use
patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining
licensing fees. . . . When the patented invention is but a small component of the product the
companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue
leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.”).
115 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391; see, e.g., Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co.,
717 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Where two companies are in competition against one
another, the patentee suffers the harm—often irreparable—of being forced to compete
against products that incorporate and infringe its own patented inventions. The evidence
submitted by Douglas leads this court to conclude Douglas has suffered irreparable injury
from Buyers’s infringement.”); Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1154
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (reversing denial of injunction where parties were direct competitors). On
appeal, the Federal Circuit has seemingly favored injunctions in the wake of eBay more
than the district courts have. See Ryan T. Holte & Christopher B. Seaman, Patent
Injunctions on Appeal: An Empirical Study of the Federal Circuit’s Application of eBay, 92
WASH. L. REV. 145, 202 (2017) (“[T]he Federal Circuit is generally more favorable to
prevailing patentees regarding permanent injunctive relief than the district courts
following eBay. District courts that grant an injunction after a finding of liability are highly
likely to be affirmed on appeal, whereas district courts that deny an injunction have a
statistically significant lower affirmance rate.”).
116 Seaman, supra note 114, at 1990–91 (“Patent holders who competed with an
infringer were granted a permanent injunction in the overwhelming majority of cases (84%;
150 of 179 cases), while patentees who were not market competitors rarely succeeded in
obtaining injunctive relief (21%; 8 of 39 cases).”).
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competitor of the defendant.117 Some commentators applaud this
emphasis on competition; 118 others have criticized it. 119 In any
event, it is the market-related injuries that have mostly justified
findings of irreparable harm that supported injunctions—most
commonly, a loss of market share,120 but also harm to goodwill,
price erosion, and diminished future business opportunities.121
If a dependent claim is drafted to encompass a patentee’s
commercial product, infringement of that claim would underscore
the competitive relationship between the patentee and the
infringer, weighing more strongly in favor of injunctive relief.
Infringement only of a broader independent claim, closer to the
periphery of the patent, is less likely to have as strong an effect in
the patentee’s competitive space. At a minimum, the nature and
degree of competitive harm would become more speculative the
further away from the patentee’s commercial activities that the
infringement occurred.
It is not enough that there be a competitive market injury,
however, without proof of causation. The Federal Circuit’s “nexus” test
requires that, to demonstrate irreparable harm, there be a causal
connection between the harm and the patented feature(s) that were
infringed.122 In many industries, such as pharmaceuticals, there is little
doubt that a patented compound is purchased from one competitor (e.g.,
a generic drug maker) at the direct expense of the patent owner, and
117 Id. at 1988–90 (“[I]n the rare cases where a PAE was granted an injunction,
the patentee was generally a failing or failed operating company that had previously sought
to commercialize the patent and thus was only a non-practicing entity at the time of the
injunction decision. . . . [A] patentee who has attempted to commercialize its invention—
even if that effort was ultimately unsuccessful—has a better chance than other PAEs of
demonstrating irreparable harm, which is a critical part of the eBay analysis.”).
118 See, e.g., Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing
Landscape for Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543, 571 (2008) (“[B]oth the existence
of competition and the relative contribution the patented invention makes to the infringing
device should play an important role in deciding whether to grant a permanent injunction.”).
119 See, e.g., Holte, supra note 114, at 733 (“While every case must be reviewed
individually, the post-eBay 78%–84% drop in post-trial permanent injunction grants for
patent infringers who are not market competitors is a broad abuse of eBay practice that
needs to be further analyzed and potentially contained.”).
120 Seaman, supra note 114, at 1993 (“[T]he most common reason by far for finding
irreparable harm was loss of market share (80%). This is perhaps unsurprising in light of
district courts’ willingness to grant an injunction when the parties are competitors.”).
121 Id. at 1993 (“Another significant source of irreparable harm was loss of
goodwill or reputation (43%) due to the infringement. This type of loss may be irreparable
because goodwill is ‘often difficult to quantify’ and thus may be difficult or impossible to
compensate with money damages.” (citing Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co.,
717 F.3d 1336, 1344–46 (Fed. Cir. 2013))); id. at 1993 (“[P]rice erosion (13%) and loss of
future business opportunities (19%) are competition-related harms.”). Somewhat
surprisingly in this equitable context, willfulness had no statistically significant effect on
injunction decisions. Id. at 1999 (“[A] finding of willful infringement does not have a
statistically significant correlation with permanent injunction decisions.”).
122 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633, 639 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[T]here
must be proof that the infringement causes the harm.”); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
735 F.3d 1352, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Apple must show some connection between the
patented feature and demand for Samsung’s products.”).
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that the purchase is made because of the compound’s chemical and
biological properties. Those industries, unsurprisingly, have very high
injunction rates.123
In industries with more multifaceted products, however, it
can be difficult to show that the cause of the patentee’s market
injury is the defendant’s inclusion of the infringing feature and not
some other factor (e.g., other non-patented features, product
pricing, or branding). 124 Thus, electronics and software patents,
which tend to involve a plethora of interoperating features and
components, have been among the technologies with the lowest
injunction rates. 125 As Professor Chao has explained, “a single
infringing feature rarely, if ever, ‘causes’ [a] consumer[ ] to buy the
infringer’s multicomponent product.”126
Here, if a dependent claim is drafted to encompass the
patentee’s commercial product, that fact has no necessary correlation
to nexus. The feature covered by the dependent claim, and even those
covered by its independent claim, may or may not be of sufficient
importance to be the cause of any market injury. Even though both
the patented and infringing products would occupy a smaller
competitive space, which makes the range of infringing substitutes
on the market proportionally smaller, that alone says nothing about
whether any sales lost to the infringer were because of the patented
feature.127 That said, if nexus can be proven otherwise, the likelihood
that the resulting harm will be the type recognized as irreparable
(i.e., competitive injury) is higher in the case of dependent claims

123 Seaman, supra note 114, at 1985 (“[P]ermanent injunctions are almost
always granted in cases where the patented technology at issue involves biotechnology
(100%) or pharmaceuticals (92%).”).
124 See Macom Tech. Sol. Holdings, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 881 F.3d 1323, 1330
(Fed. Cir. 2018) (“This [nexus] requirement ‘ensures that an injunction is only entered against a
defendant on account of a harm resulting from the defendant’s wrongful conduct, not some other
reason.’” (quoting Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633, 640 (Fed. Cir. 2015))).
125 Seaman, supra note 114, at 1985 (“Injunctions were granted only about twothirds of the time for electronics (67%), and for medical devices (65%). Most notably,
permanent injunctions were granted only slightly over half the time in cases involving
computer software (53%)—a result that was statistically significant.”); id. at 1998 (“When
a patent is found to cover a small component, district courts rarely grant an injunction, as
reflected by the low odds ratio for this variable. Thus, it appears that district courts are
heeding Justice Kennedy’s advice to avoid injunctive relief ‘[w]hen the patented invention
is but a small component of the product the [infringer] seek[s] to produce.’” (alterations in
original) (footnote omitted) (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring))).
126 Bernard Chao, Causation and Harm in a Multicomponent World, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. ONLINE 61, 64 (2016) (“Although a competing product might take sales away from
a patentee, that loss may not be caused by the inclusion of a particular infringing
feature. . . . Devices like smartphones can be covered by literally hundreds of thousands of
patents.” (emphasis in original)).
127 As Bernard Chao posited, it is inappropriate to ever presume that certain
features are important and that infringement causes harm. Id. at 71–74 (criticizing the
Federal Circuit’s nexus jurisprudence for failing to require sufficient proof of actual harm
caused by the infringement).
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directed to the patentee’s commercial embodiment, as discussed
above.
Finally, beyond the irreparable harm and the related
inadequacy of monetary damages, 128 the remaining eBay factors
concerning the public interest and the balance of the hardships may
further weigh in favor of comparatively stronger exclusive rights in
dependent claims.129 Again, a competitive relationship between the
parties is important, as the Federal Circuit has stated that “the
public interest nearly always weighs in favor of protecting property
rights in the absence of countervailing factors, especially when the
patentee practices his inventions.” 130 The court’s emphasis on
protecting the patentee’s “investment-backed property right” 131 is
especially appropriate for dependent claims, which tend to be more
clearly defined and supported by the specification.132 Those claims
are closer to the core “invention” that resulted from the patentee’s
investment and that is most helpfully disclosed to the public via the
patent application.
As to the balance of the hardships, the Federal Circuit has held
that “forcing [a patentee] to compete against its own patented
invention” imposes a considerable hardship on the patentee—one that
is exacerbated in small markets, and one that will not easily be offset by
an infringer’s need to remove or design around only the specific patented
feature(s).133 By that reasoning, a patentee whose commercial product
128 Commentators have noted that the irreparable harm and inadequacy of
money damages factors of the eBay test, though recited separately, are essentially
redundant. Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s
Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 209
(2012) (noting that eBay’s “requirements of (1) irreparable injury and (2) inadequacy of
legal remedies are redundant as these are, traditionally speaking, one and the same”);
Jeremy Mulder, Note, The Aftermath of eBay: Predicting When District Courts Will
Grant Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 67, 80 (2007)
(“Courts collapse the first two factors [of the eBay test], apparently viewing irreparable
harm, if an injunction is not granted, and inadequate remedy at law, in the form of
damages, as opposite sides of the same coin.”).
129 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (A patentee must
show “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such
as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted;
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”).
130 Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 809 F.3d 633, 647 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
131 Id. (“[T]he public often benefits from healthy competition. However, the public
generally does not benefit when that competition comes at the expense of a patentee’s
investment-backed property right. To conclude otherwise would suggest that this factor
weighs against an injunction in every case, when the opposite is generally true. We base this
conclusion not only on the Patent Act’s statutory right to exclude, which derives from the
Constitution, but also on the importance of the patent system in encouraging innovation.
Injunctions are vital to this system.”).
132 See supra Part III.
133 Apple Inc., 809 F.3d at 646 (“Samsung’s infringement harmed Apple by causing
lost market share and lost downstream sales and by forcing Apple to compete against its own
patented invention, which ‘places a substantial hardship’ on a patentee, especially here where
it is undisputed that it is essentially a two-horse race. Furthermore, as the district court
found, Apple’s proposed injunction was narrowly tailored to cause no harm to Samsung other
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is specifically protected by a dependent claim would have comparatively
stronger grounds for an injunction—the dependent claims focus on the
most important competitive space and are comparatively easier to avoid
and design around if enjoined.
IV.

SHARED RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFORM

Ostensibly, the only reason why patent remedies
determinations do not significantly consider the relative nature
and scope of the claims involved is a lack of attention to the issue.
With more purposeful development of the foregoing remedies
theories, a more complete and accurate picture of private harms
and public benefits can be constructed. Like many litigation
reform efforts, this will be best accomplished by the combined
efforts of parties, experts, and judges.
Typically, in a patent trial, the damages models present an allor-nothing approach, assuming that all asserted claims are infringed134
and not considering the relative value of the claims. Some of this may
be caused by tight time pressure at trial or pressure to limit the number
of claims being asserted to keep matters sufficiently simple for the jury.
Or it may be because independent and dependent claims have long been
understood to “stand or fall” together in important ways, 135 though
especially when the claims are not separately argued.136 This leads to
results like those discussed above, where courts assume there is no
meaningful difference as to remedies among the claims even if there
might be.137
than to deprive it of the ability to continue to use Apple’s patented features.” (quoting Robert
Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2011))).
134 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The
hypothetical negotiation [framework for assessing patent damages] also assumes that the
asserted patent claims are valid and infringed.”).
135 See, e.g., Callaway Golf Co. v. Acushnet Co., 576 F.3d 1331, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (“A broader independent claim cannot be nonobvious where a dependent claim
stemming from that independent claim is invalid for obviousness.”); Wahpeton Canvas Co.
v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1552 n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“One who does not infringe
an independent claim cannot infringe a claim dependent on (and thus containing all the
limitations of) that claim.”).
136 See, e.g., Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(invalidating claims dependent on an invalid base claim because the dependent claims
were not argued separately); In re Nielson, 816 F.2d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1987); PerkinElmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“Because the
claims have generally been argued together, the validity of all the claims stands or falls
with claims 1 and 7.”); In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Since neither
of the parties argue separately the patentability of each of the rejected claims, the
dependent claims will stand or fall with independent claims 1 and 10.”).
137 See supra notes 65–69 and accompanying text; see also CollegeNet, Inc. v.
ApplyYourself, Inc., 418 F.3d 1225, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“ApplyYourself also challenges the
district court’s refusal to grant a new trial on the jury’s finding of infringement as to various
dependent claims of the ‘278 patent. However, having affirmed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment of infringement of claims 1, 9, 10 and 21 of the ‘278 patent, there is no
reason for this court to reach this argument. After all, infringement of even a single claim
entitles a patentee to damages. Therefore, even if the district court had concluded that the
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The tendency to lump together multiple patent claims for all-ornothing disposition has perhaps been most pronounced in the aftermath
of the landmark Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International
decision,138 where many claims were being held patent-ineligible under
Section 101 upon the early adjudication of one or two “representative”
claims.139 The Federal Circuit has endorsed the representative claims
approach at least when the parties have failed to treat the claims
independently,140 but even then that approach is in tension with some
of the court’s own precedent.141 Some judges have now pushed back on
broad-stroke motions that encompass many distinct claims in the
Section 101 context, requiring that the burden be carried across all
challenged claims, 142 and the Federal Circuit itself recently imposed
infringement verdicts on claims 6-8 and 27 of the ‘278 patent were against the clear weight of
the evidence, the damages awarded on the ‘278 patent would still stand.”); Wahpeton Canvas
Co., 870 F.2d at 1552 n.10 (“Because a reversal on appeal on one independent claim would
give Wahpeton all it needs for victory, submission of the infringement issue on a plethora of
dependent claims in Wahpeton’s motion and appeal is difficult to understand. Infringement
of an independent claim would result in the same damage award as would infringement of all
claims dependent thereon and non-infringement of an independent claim carries with it noninfringement of all claims dependent thereon.”); see also Total Containment, Inc. v. Environ
Prods., Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1355, 1394 n.20 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (“The court knows of no reason for
asserting the numerous dependent claims that have been asserted in this action. The
damages are the same whether there is infringement of one or one hundred claims. Damages
are not multiplied by the number of claims infringed.”).
138 Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
139 See, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1147 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (affirming judgment as to 8 claims based on analysis of single representative claim);
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (affirming
judgment as to 5 claims based on analysis of single representative claim); Content Extraction &
Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(affirming judgment as to 242 claims based on consideration of only two representative claims).
140 See Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“Courts may
treat a claim as representative in certain situations, such as if the patentee does not present
any meaningful argument for the distinctive significance of any claim limitations not found
in the representative claim or if the parties agree to treat a claim as representative.”);
Content Extraction & Transmission, LLC, 776 F.3d at 1348 (permitting treatment of
“representative claim” where the patentee “never asserted . . .that the district court should
have differentiated any claim from those identified as representative . . . . [n]or did [the
patentee] identify any other claims as purportedly containing an inventive concept”).
141 While it might be proper to dispose of dependent claims that admittedly rise or fall
with an independent claim pre-issuance, given the presumption of validity for issued patents,
the Federal Circuit has previously held “that rule has no application in a district court
proceeding to determine whether the claims of an issued patent are valid.” Shelcore, Inc. v.
Durham Indus., 745 F.2d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also id. at 625 (“[A] party challenging the
validity of a claim, absent a pretrial agreement or stipulation, must submit evidence supporting
a conclusion of invalidity of each claim the challenger seeks to destroy.” (emphasis in original)).
142 See, e.g., Pragmatus Telecom, LLC v. Genesys Telecomms. Labs., Inc., 114 F.
Supp. 3d 192, 199 (D. Del. 2015) (“All Defendants have done is stated, in a conclusory fashion,
that none of the other asserted claims in the other three patents include ‘any meaningful
limitation’ that establishes patent eligibility. This is not enough. Absent additional analysis,
the Court will only deal with the patent eligibility of the claims of the ‘314 Patent. If
Defendants wish to challenge the other patents under § 101, they must actually provide
analysis for this position.”); TriPlay, Inc. v. WhatsApp Inc., No. 13-1703-LPS, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55068, at *18-19 (D. Del. Apr. 28, 2015) (“[F]rom a procedural and practical
perspective, a process in which a defendant seeks to have large groups of claims ruled subject
matter ineligible after giving negligible attention to them strikes the Court as unfair and
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more procedural hurdles to successful Section 101 challenges. 143
Whether judge driven or party driven (likely both), the shift toward
more purposeful consideration of individual claims in the Section 101
context may substantially reduce all-or-nothing decisions based on
representative claims.144 If nothing else, more individualized treatment
properly respects the function of claiming and the distinct legal effects
of each claim.
A similar effort from both parties and judges should be made to
push for individualized consideration of patent remedies on a claim-byclaim basis. Judges are more inclined to consider claims individually
when the parties treat the claims individually.145 And parties are more
inclined to do that if judges express interest in understanding the
differences and nuances between asserted claims and how they might
justify a range of results. This can be accomplished via discovery orders,
local rules, alternative dispute resolution, or other means. Notably, some
courts already require early damages disclosures that seem to permit, but
do not specifically encourage or require, this kind of claim-by-claim
discussion.146
fraught with the potential for problematic decisionmaking. In the end, as the moving party,
Defendant bears the burden to demonstrate that its asserted Section 101 defense is well taken
as to each claim. In the absence of significant discussion regarding claims other than claims
1 and 12, the Court finds that Defendant has not carried its burden as to those claims.”).
143 Specifically, the Federal Circuit held that “[w]hether something is wellunderstood, routine, and conventional to a skilled artisan at the time of the patent is a
factual determination.” Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1369. Such facts may be established by the
patent specification. See id. at 1370. Such factual averments must also be accepted as true
when stated in the patentee’s complaint for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes. See Aatrix Software,
Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1130 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
144 The Federal Circuit also acknowledged that “not every § 101 determination
contains genuine disputes over the underlying facts material to the § 101 inquiry.”
Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368. Further, that claim construction should but is not required
to occur as needed to resolve § 101 disputes at the pleadings stage, which may temper the
effects of those recent decisions. See Aatrix, 882 F.3d at 1125.
145 See, e.g., Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 140 n.2 (2009) (“That argument
might have convinced us had it been pressed, but the Government conceded the breach, and
we analyze the case as it comes to us.”); Calgon Carbon Corp. v. Potomac Capital Inv. Corp.,
No. 98-0072, 2007 WL 2907865, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2007) (“All defendants are
sophisticated parties with the benefit of very experienced counsel. In fact, defendants had
numerous attorneys present at all times during trial. During the course of trial, the court can
only rule on arguments made and motions presented by such experienced counsel. The court
did not, and would not, question defendants’ strategic choice to rely on the novel argument
that contributory negligence was not an affirmative defense under Florida law, and therefore,
did not have to be pled in federal court. They argued this consistently and vigorously.
Defendants’ attempts to second guess this strategy, and place their mistakes at the feet of
this court are disingenuous, at best.”).
146 See, e.g., Local Patent Rule 2-1(b)(5) (N.D. Cal.) (requiring that, at the Initial
Case Management Conference, “[t]he parties shall provide the court with a non-binding,
good-faith estimate of the damages range expected for the case along with an explanation
for the estimates”); Local Patent Rule 3-8 (requiring disclosure of Damages Contentions
during discovery, where parties must “[i]dentify each of the category(-ies) of damages it is
seeking for the asserted infringement, as well as its theories of recovery, factual support
for those theories, and computations of damages within each category”); Local Patent Rule
3.6 (W.D. Pa.) (“Not later than fourteen (14) calendar days after production of the summary
sales and use information set forth in LPR 3.5, the party asserting patent infringement
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Expert witnesses warrant special attention, as their testimony
is among the primary sources of evidence by which remedies are
assessed.147 Damages experts provide appraisals and economics experts
evaluate market effects. Parties should ensure that their experts at
least consider and offer alternative opinions in the event that only some
asserted claims are both valid and infringed. Although the hypothetical
negotiation framework for assessing reasonable royalty damages,148 for
example, assumes that the asserted claims are valid and infringed,149
nothing in the law requires that the assessment only be done wholesale,
assuming that all asserted claims are valid and infringed.
As noted above, some claims may specifically cover
commercial products of the patentee and substantially influence the
harm resulting from any infringement.150 Similarly, the cost and ease
of implementing a design-around influences the royalty rate and may
differ significantly from claim to claim. 151 If there are such
meaningful differences of claim scope, an expert’s failure to factor
those differences into the analysis does a disservice to his or her
client—if only some of those claims turn out to be valid and infringed,
any damages award might be “clearly not supported by the evidence,
or based only on speculation or guesswork,” and cannot be upheld.152
The failure of an expert to conduct a distinct claims assessment may
even warrant excluding the expert’s opinion under Daubert v. Merrell

shall serve upon the party asserting non-infringement a good faith estimate of its expected
damages, including a summary description of the method used to arrive at that estimate.”).
147 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012 & Supp. V 2018) (“The court may receive expert
testimony as an aid to the determination of damages or of what royalty would be reasonable
under the circumstances.”).
148 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) (listing various factors for assessing a “reasonable royalty” measure of
damages, such factors purporting to approximate the value of a license to use the patent
and/or invention overall).
149 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The
hypothetical negotiation [framework for assessing patent damages] also assumes that the
asserted patent claims are valid and infringed.”).
150 See supra Part II.
151 See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 1350–51
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[A] fair and accurate reconstruction of the ‘but for’ market also must take
into account, where relevant, alternative actions the infringer foreseeably would have
undertaken had he not infringed. Without the infringing product, a rational would-be
infringer is likely to offer an acceptable noninfringing alternative, if available, to compete
with the patent owner rather than leave the market altogether.”).
152 Lucent Techs., Inc., 580 F.3d at 1310 (quoting State Contracting & Eng’g Corp. v.
Condotte Am., Inc., 346 F.3d 1057, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.153 and Rule 702154 for being economically
unsound and unreliable.155
To avoid such outcomes, parties should not only affirmatively
offer expert testimony that accounts for plausible partial verdicts on
liability, but should also cross-examine the opposing expert on the
subject, employing mechanisms like motions in limine and Daubert
challenges to further police inadequate damages assessments or other
market harm analysis.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to conventional wisdom, dependent claims may
frequently be more valuable to the public and to the patent owner
than their independent base claims. Consequently, those
dependent claims may warrant comparatively stronger remedies
and greater recovery. Recognizing this relativity provides patent
remedies with desirable flexibility.156 Because such grading only
potentially limits—but does not mandate or eliminate—any
particular remedies, it is a fine-tuning tool to help strike the right
balance between too-broad claims that unduly preempt the field
and too-narrow claims that under-incentivize innovation and
commercialization.157 Finally, this grading continues to encourage
153 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (“The
inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one. Its overarching subject is
the scientific validity—and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability—of the principles
that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” (footnotes omitted)).
154 FED. R. EVID. 702 (“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the
expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient
facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”).
155 See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (explaining that royalty rates that are “arbitrary” and “unrelated to the facts of th[e]
case” are “unreliable and irrelevant”); see also Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298
F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining that damages experts must base their
damages theories on “sound economic and factual predicates”).
156 John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 553
(2010) (“[R]egardless of how extreme or moderate one makes the default rules for patent
remedies, there seems likely to be a nontrivial probability that those rules are not quite
right and, indeed, perhaps very wrong in a significant number of cases. Incorporation of
some flex in such default rules would therefore seem wise.”).
157 Merges & Nelson, supra note 58, at 875 (“Property rights that are too narrow will
not provide enough incentive to develop the asset, while overly broad rights will preempt too
many competitive development efforts.”). Many substantive patent doctrines affect this balance
as well, but as John Golden explained, remedies are among the many aspects of the patent
system that must all be adjusted to fine-tune and optimize outcomes. See Golden, supra note
156, at 527 (“For the policy maker seeking to fine-tune the operation of the patent system, the
presence of so many interacting and adjustable parts complicates the task of finding the optimal
balance. Adjusting one knob can require compensating adjustments to any of a number of others.
Altering the length of the patent term, for example, can substantially affect the extent to which
a patentee is likely to be properly rewarded, thereby generating a need for weaker or stronger
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the examination efficiencies that flow from using dependent
claims, but also encourages production of higher-quality patent
disclosures that more clearly signal and define the most important
embodiments of the invention. 158 For the benefit of the patent
system, parties, their experts, and judges should pay closer
attention to claim scope and claim type when assessing remedies.
To be clear, the point is not that damages are currently too
high or too low, or that injunctions are too easy or too difficult to
obtain. The point is that meaningful differences in claim scope should
matter—and not just for validity and infringement purposes. Each
patent claim that is asserted is, in effect, a distinct cause of action
and it should be treated as such. If, as Judge Giles Rich famously
proclaimed, “the name of the game is the claim,”159 then the game
should come out differently when different claims are in play.

remedies.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Chao, supra note 36, at 1371 (arguing that “patent law
needs to constrain claim scope so that it does not depart too far from the specification . . . without
limiting claims to the described embodiments and their most trivial variations,” and that
flexibility in remedies law can accomplish that result).
158 Golden, supra note 156, at 561 (“The principle of learning looks toward
fashioning a regime of patent remedies that encourages the production of information that
can be used to improve the regime itself.”); id. at 562 (2010) (“[T]he burdens of production and
proof assigned and the form of relief ultimately provided should, all else being equal, be
arranged so as to encourage optimal information production and disclosure.”).
159 Rich, supra note 25, at 499 (“To coin a phrase, the name of the game is the claim.”).

